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Francis Fox: Back in 1963, . . . if you knew what was going to 
happen over the next 31 years, would you not have ripped up (b)(3) 
entirely and told Ben Kaplan, “this is just too much trouble. We 
shouldn’t manufacture this”? 
Arthur Miller: In ’63 I might have said that . . . . I was a young punk 
kid. 
Exchange at a January 17, 1997, meeting of the Federal Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee. 
In 1984, the prominent Philadelphia lawyer David Berger wanted to 
muscle into litigation that schools around the country had begun to recover 
the costs of asbestos abatement. Trying to seize control of hundreds of 
lawsuits, he moved under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for the certification of a class of all public and private schools in the 
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country. The lawyer representing the Los Angeles United School District 
was upset, as Berger’s motion threatened to take his case—and with it 
huge potential fees—away from him. “You have got to be the greatest 
asshole that ever stepped into a court of law,” this lawyer wrote in a letter 
to Berger, “and I would like to go to my blessed reward knowing that I 
personally met the greatest at something.”1 
The current era of class action litigation began on July 1, 1966, when a 
newly-revised Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into 
effect.
2
 To anyone interested in buccaneering attorneys, maverick judges, 
mind-boggling settlement sums, idealistic lawyering, or base legal 
corruption, the next forty-odd years have yielded a rich harvest. But this 
period may be ending. In recent years, the United States Supreme Court 
has paid unusually close attention to Rule 23,
3
 and several of its decisions 
may herald a very different federal class action than what has previously 
prevailed.
4
 More than just colorful episodes could be on the chopping 
block. Believing that the Court’s handiwork particularly harms plaintiffs, 
influential observers wonder what, if anything, will be left of the 
mechanism that has long stirred passions more than any other procedural 
rule.
5
 
If an era has indeed ended, then its history is in order.
6
 Historical 
inquiry “has its own interest and charm,” as Jerry Mashaw writes at the 
 
 
 1. Rich Arthurs, Class Action Debate Explodes in Asbestos Cleanup Litigation, LEGAL TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 1984, at 2. 
 2. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev’d, 391 F.2d 555 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (reporting Rule 23’s effective date). 
 3. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
2368 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 4. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2541; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 
1740. 
 5. For Wal-Mart’s effect on employment discrimination litigation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., “You 
Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, BNA INSIGHTS, Vol. 80, No. 3, at 
93 (2012). For Concepcion’s effect in consumer protection litigation, see, for example, Myriam Gilles 
& Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 640–58 (2012). 
 6. Existing histories of the class action end in the 1960s or shortly thereafter. See STEPHEN C. 
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); David 
Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the Modern Class 
Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011); Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: 
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing 
Yeazell’s book); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of 
the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (ending in 1940). Another article 
provides a detailed account of the drafting of various amendments to Rule 23, but does not describe 
doctrinal evolution outside the rulemaking process. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 
23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323 (2005). 
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start of his monumental study of early administrative law.
7
 Certainly 
something as important as the federal class action deserves to have its 
story told for this reason alone. But the history promises additional 
rewards, for “historical inquiry is also a species of comparative method.”8 
It offers a foil for the present, to help determine what is truly new in the 
world of aggregate litigation, and whether ostensible developments require 
novel doctrine. Those concerned with the Court’s recent class action 
adventures, for example, can use the history recounted here and in future 
articles to better understand what the Court has done to the federal class 
action, how well its current management of the device fits historical 
patterns, and whether anything justifies the changes it has worked to class 
action practice. 
This normative use of history must wait, for a complete account of the 
modern class action’s evolution requires more than an article-length 
treatment. My job here is to provide the first chapter, covering a period 
from 1953 to 1980.
9
 1953 marks an obvious starting date, as work on what 
became the modern Rule 23 began that year. The case for 1980 as this 
period’s end is harder to make. It is not as if a federal judge arrived at 
work on January 2, 1981, read a motion for class certification over the 
morning’s coffee, and suddenly felt the winds of change begin to blow. 
There is always something artificial about periodicity in history, and the 
task is to draw temporal boundaries with as little arbitrariness as possible. 
For at least two reasons, 1980 is a good candidate. As its doctrinal 
foundation hardened, the fledgling class action withstood a great deal of 
Sturm und Drang, but this upheaval had largely run its course by the end 
of the 1970s. A period of relative calm in class action discourse set in at 
that point. Also, soon after 1980, the doctrine and jurisprudence of class 
actions changed, reflecting a new set of intellectual concerns and the rise 
of the mass tort class action.
10
 
 
 
 7. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Subsequent articles will cover the rise of the mass tort class action in the 1980s, Rule 23’s 
crises in the 1990s, and developments since the turn of the century. 
 10. The first decision, state or federal, certifying a mass tort (as opposed to mass accident) class 
came in 1979. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. 
Mass, 1983); see also In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION REP. 469, 469 (1978) (describing Payton’s 
novelty). On the difference between mass tort and mass accident litigation, see, for example, REPORT 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
11–12 (1999). As far as my research suggests, the first certified mass accident class came in Am. 
Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The 1980s 
saw the development of a more sophisticated body of class action scholarship concerned less with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This first period of the modern class action was exceptionally 
important. During these years, courts took the infant device and crafted a 
new body of doctrine for its use. Lawyers and decision-makers awoke to 
the promises and perils of aggregate litigation, powerful plaintiffs’ side 
firms emerged that would set procedural agendas going forward,
11
 and 
corporate interests began to organize to pursue a distinct legal agenda.
12
 I 
regret that I have left some of this material on the cutting room floor for 
length concerns. Instead, I focus my story on a clash of ideas about how 
best to think about Rule 23 and the influence this conflict had on doctrinal 
development. Consumer advocates, civil rights practitioners, and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers argued for what I call the “regulatory conception” of 
Rule 23. According to this understanding, class actions offered an 
important substitute for, or addition to, public administration, and courts 
should deploy the device aggressively to maximize regulatory efficacy. 
Their adversaries on the defense side responded with an “adjectival 
conception.”13 Like any other procedural rule, Rule 23 was distinctly 
subordinate to the substantive law, and whatever good it might accomplish 
could not justify extreme distortions to procedural normalcy. 
These dueling conceptions of Rule 23 presented decision-makers, 
challenged by a new species of lawsuits in the 1970s, with a dilemma 
about how best to govern the class action. Creating a powerful cadre of 
private attorneys general, class actions promised important contributions 
to the federal regulatory state. Excessive concern that Rule 23’s 
deployment might distort the substantive law or upend normal dispute 
resolution processes could hamstring its application and deny the class 
action a proper regulatory role. On the other hand, exotic departures from 
 
 
doctrinal disputes and more with the device’s theoretical challenges. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class 
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (insisting that “civil procedure . . . is too important to be left to 
proceduralists,” then commenting on the narrow scope of class action scholarship). 
 11. The now-defunct but once-powerful plaintiffs’ firm Milberg Weiss was founded in 1965. 
James P. McDonald, Note, Milberg’s Monopoly: Restoring Honesty and Competition to the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, 58 DUKE L.J. 507, 511 (2008). Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein began in 1972. See About 
us, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/about/2/overview (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
 12. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Snyder, Jr., Chairman, Education 
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971) (on file with the Washington & Lee School 
of Law Library). 
 13. The term “adjectival” is an old-fashioned one, used by Jeremy Bentham and commentators 
throughout the 19th Century to describe the law of procedure and remedies. E.g., WALTER DENTON 
SMITH, A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY LAW § 166, at 110–11 (1896). The term is useful, as it signals the 
secondary or dependent status of procedural law as compared to substantive law.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/2
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litigation norms in the name of regulatory efficacy could decouple the 
federal courts from traditional institutional settings and constraints. 
My main claim has to do with how decision-makers, including the 
federal courts and Congress, responded to this governance dilemma. They 
chose not to resolve the normative divide between the regulatory and 
adjectival conceptions. Instead, they used a pragmatic balancing strategy 
to craft a body of doctrine that served the value of regulatory efficacy 
without undermining the federal judiciary’s institutional integrity. This 
domestication of Rule 23 resulted in some doctrinal incoherence, but it 
succeeded in stabilizing class action law and politics by the end of the 
1970s. This strategy would match how decision-makers have regulated 
public administration more generally, a fitting equivalence given Rule 
23’s importance to the American regulatory state. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the regulatory and 
adjectival conceptions and the dilemma of class action governance, some 
necessary table-setting before the history can start. Part II shows how hints 
of the regulatory and adjectival conceptions surfaced in the drafting 
history of Rule 23, conflicting with politicized accounts that make claims 
about authorial intentions to argue for one understanding of Rule 23 or the 
other. Part III turns to the politics of class actions in the 1970s. As 
opposing camps formed, combatants’ arguments aligned around Rule 23’s 
normative divide, suggesting its importance to doctrinal evolution. Part IV 
elaborates on the governance dilemma lurking behind Rule 23’s politics, 
then shows how decision-makers used a pragmatic balancing strategy in 
each of Rule 23’s substantive areas to stabilize this litigation by the 
period’s end in 1980. 
My account has a few limitations. First, I mostly neglect the 
development of class action doctrine in state courts, which also began after 
the new Rule 23 went in effect in 1966.
14
 Until the 1980s, at the earliest, 
this litigation paled in regulatory and doctrinal significance to federal 
efforts. Moreover, my emphasis on management strategies for the federal 
class action governance renders state class actions less important to this 
narrative. Still, I acknowledge this lacuna. Second, no one of whom I am 
aware actually used the terms “regulatory” and “adjectival conception” 
during this period. Decision-makers sometimes molded class action law 
with sensitivity to the ideas behind these understandings of Rule 23, and 
sometimes they did not. But these labels usefully describe the arguments 
 
 
 14. Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REV. 718, 
718–19 (1979). 
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class action partisans made and the concerns that decision-makers voiced 
during this period as they constructed the class action’s doctrinal 
foundation. With apologies for these and other shortcomings my story 
assuredly has, I begin its first chapter. 
I. CLASS ACTION ANXIETY 
The history of the modern class action is an American story. 
Depending on who tells it, it is either a story of good-hearted private 
citizens riding to the rescue of vulnerable communities injured by 
corporate behemoths, or a tale of massive corruption engineered by lawyer 
parasites. It is a story of scrappy lawyer underdogs driven by a mixture of 
ego, money, and righteous indignation as they assault corporate goliaths. It 
is a story of deregulation, of the civil rights movement’s ebbs and flows, 
of the perils of a mass consumer society, of judicial activism, of HIV, of 
tobacco, and of Wall Street greed. It is a capitalism story about the 
commodification of law enforcement. 
The history of the modern class action is also a story of a fight over 
ideas about litigation’s proper role in a democracy. The conflict involves a 
basic problem that, to my mind, any history of Rule 23 must address: is 
the class action a mere procedural device, or is it a regulatory instrument? 
When deployed in a manner consistent with the regulatory conception, the 
class action can create problems of democratic accountability. Lashed to 
the adjectival conception’s restrictive mast, however, the class action loses 
some of its regulatory force. In this Part, I introduce this central dilemma 
for Rule 23 at some length, as I believe that its proper resolution served as 
an important goal as the law of class actions evolved in the 1960s and 
1970s. The rest of the story unfolds in its terms. 
A. The Regulatory and Adjectival Conceptions of Rule 23 
Arguments concerning Rule 23’s proper use tend to reflect one of two 
competing conceptions of the class action and its proper role in litigation 
and law enforcement more generally.
15
 The regulatory conception treats 
Rule 23 as “an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
unremedied by the regulatory action of government,” to quote Warren 
 
 
 15. Others have identified this dichotomy but have discussed it in somewhat different terms. E.g., 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1941–46 (2011); 
Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representation Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459; 
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27–28 
(1982). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN CLASS ACTION, PART I 593 
 
 
 
 
Burger’s classic description.16 Captured or resource-strapped public 
agencies cannot adequately enforce the substantive law, requiring a 
privately-initiated alternative.
17
 Individual litigation helps, but leaves a lot 
of law under-enforced or un-enforced. Their small values discourage the 
litigation of a lot of claims, and even when individual plaintiffs sue, 
asymmetries in the resources that the parties can marshal for litigation 
often favor the defendant and distort the outcome.
18
 Rule 23 responds to 
these problems and, in so doing, pushes the substantive law closer to 
maximal implementation. Economies of scale reaped from claim joinder 
enable an independent, well-financed cadre of private attorneys general to 
compensate for the inadequacies of government regulators and individual 
litigants. 
This conception prioritizes regulatory efficacy as a primary value. The 
class action succeeds when, as a substitute for public administration, it 
helps implement a positive program of social or economic reform.
19
 
Individual remediation is a secondary goal, if that.
20
 Several implications 
follow from this emphasis, but two are particularly important. A claim 
might have an element, like individual causation, that requires proof 
tailored to the particular litigant. If this element resists resolution in a 
class-wide proceeding, a court can adjust it if doing so facilitates class 
certification. In particular, these adjustments can legitimately minimize 
aspects of claims that concern any particular class member’s right to 
recover, since class members properly conceived serve as regulatory 
vehicles.
21
 Courts should train their attention instead on the defendant’s 
conduct toward the aggregate, for this is what needs regulating. Likewise, 
judges can modify the ordinary civil process for dispute resolution. 
Specifically, individualized adjudications can yield to damages-scheduling 
 
 
 16. Deposit Guar. Nat’l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). For prominent advocacy of 
one version of the regulatory conception or another, see, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The 
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory 
of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass 
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987). 
 17. Fiss, supra note 16, at 22–23. 
 18. E.g., David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons 
from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 709–10 (1989). 
 19. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 439 (6th ed. 2009). 
 20. E.g., Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Does it Go Far Enough?, 63 A.B.A. J. 837, 842 (1977) (“The 
primary function of the class action is deterrence of harmful conduct . . . . Judicial efficiency and 
compensation of small claimants are merely desirable by-products.”). 
 21. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 753, 791–97 (2007) (criticizing a version of this claim). 
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or some equivalent quasi-administrative process, provided for in a 
settlement agreement. 
The adjectival conception begins with the premise that Rule 23, like 
any other joinder rule, serves classically procedural goals.
22
 If many 
people have similar claims against one or a small number of defendants, 
then they can litigate their claims together if doing so would enable these 
individuals to obtain fairly and efficiently whatever remedy the pre-
existing substantive law affords them.
23
 Class actions help resolve disputes 
and thereby restore social order. They are not in the main regulatory tools 
to be wielded for the achievement of administrative objectives. Any 
regulatory bite above and beyond what individual litigation would have 
must be incidental to objectives of procedural fairness and efficiency.
24
 
Two implications that follow from the adjectival conception make its 
contrast with the regulatory conception clear. First, a court bent on class 
certification cannot invoke regulatory efficacy to justify alterations to the 
substantive law, which must remain undisturbed by the procedural avenue 
chosen for its vindication.
25
 Second, since a class action is no more than an 
aggregate of individual claims, the court that manages it should minimize, 
to the extent possible, its procedural deviation from ordinary processes of 
dispute resolution. 
B. Regulatory Efficacy Versus Democratic Legitimacy 
In one sense, the divide over ways of thinking about Rule 23 tracks a 
familiar dispute that pits pragmatic consequentialism against an insistence 
upon principled limits. To supporters of the regulatory conception, the 
good it accomplishes legitimates Rule 23’s use. The normative case for 
this claim is straightforward. Since the 1960s, the design of the federal 
regulatory apparatus has included a substantial role for private litigation,
26
 
 
 
 22. For prominent advocacy of one version of the adjectival conception or another, see, for 
example, Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection 
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71; Richard A. Nagareda, The 
Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181 (2003); 
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
475. 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 24. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-
Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1894 (2006). 
 25. E.g., Redish, supra note 22, at 75–76 (“incidental”); Nagareda, supra note 22, at 174. 
 26. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 12 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/2
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and a powerful, flexibly-deployed class action device contributes 
importantly to this scheme’s success.27 
To the extent that it supports applications of Rule 23 only loosely-
bound by prior substantive or procedural constraints, however, this 
regulatory consequentialism conflicts with the underlying impulse of the 
adjectival conception: Rule 23, as an inferior procedural device, is not a 
roving license for law reform.
28
 Limits fixed by legal principle must cabin 
its use. A host of reasons, mostly elaborated upon in Part IV.A, explain 
why. But one, a justification for the adjectival conception grounded in 
democratic anxieties, merits discussion here as it helps put the early 
history of the modern class action in proper context. 
The argument goes something like this. Self-appointed private lawyers 
bring class actions under Rule 23, and unelected judges grant class 
certification motions and approve settlements that bind absent class 
members. Dragooned into litigation without their consent, individuals can 
lose causes of action when some lawyer they did not choose strikes a deal 
with the defendant. Because procedural needs tempt judges to modify 
elements of claims or defenses, Rule 23’s application can lead to 
surreptitious law reform outside of proper legislative contexts.
29
 
Supervised by lifetime-appointed judges, private attorneys exercise 
significant regulatory powers but do not answer to any electorate for their 
enforcement choices. 
This process raises concerns of democratic legitimacy, and the 
principled limits that the adjectival conception demands—the steadfast 
subordination of Rule 23 to the pre-existing substantive law and the 
insistence that processes hew as closely as possible to the individual 
lawsuit norm—respond. If a court cannot certify a class without an 
adjustment to the underlying substantive regime, the class must remain 
uncertified.
30
 Unelected judges cannot wield Rule 23 to usurp the 
legislative prerogative at the behest of private attorneys. Also, if 
individuals have pre-existing rights to bring claims under the substantive 
 
 
 27. A comparison of Securities Exchange Commission enforcement efforts versus private 
securities class action litigation is suggestive in this regard. In 2007, the SEC obtained $1.6 billion in 
disgorgement and penalties. Securities & Exchange Commission, Year-By-Year SEC Enforcement 
Actions, http://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (last visited May 11, 2012). That 
same year class action settlements in federal securities cases yielded over $8 billion. Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 811, 825 (2010). 
 28. Nagareda, supra note 24, at 1874. 
 29. E.g., Redish, supra note 22, at 73; Nagareda, supra note 22, at 197. 
 30. Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 666–70 (2006). 
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law, the regulatory good a class action can do cannot, on its own, justify 
the alteration of these rights unless individuals retain some control over 
their claims. Absent unusual circumstances, for example, class members 
must enjoy opt-out rights.
31
 
Even the restricted Rule 23 that the adjectival conception recommends, 
however, remains democratically problematic. If Rule 23 has any role to 
play in civil litigation, it must apply when class members have 
undifferentiated, small-value claims that they would never litigate 
individually. But here Rule 23 alone creates the regulatory power private 
lawyers wield. Absent class certification, no one would sue to vindicate 
these claims, and the substantive law would have no regulatory force 
whatsoever. Through the operation of a humble procedural rule, private 
attorneys and judges become powerful regulators.
32
 
Insofar as democratic anxieties motivate it, the adjectival conception at 
its extreme counsels against class treatment of claims absent explicit 
legislative authorization of the private attorney general role. This strict 
limit on Rule 23’s use may be principled, but it is troubling. If adhered to, 
it would significantly disrupt the federal regulatory apparatus as 
designed.
33
 Since so few statutes explicitly authorize class actions for 
enforcement, a great deal of substantive law would go under-enforced. On 
the other hand, regulatory efficacy as a normative justification for Rule 
23’s application offers cold comfort to those worried about democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
 
 31. Nagareda, supra note 22, at 198–203. But cf. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class 
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 
1612–13 (2007) (arguing that the right to opt out imperfectly addresses concerns of individual 
autonomy). 
 32. Proponents of the adjectival conception concede the propriety of negative-value class suits. 
Nagareda, supra note 24, at 1884; see also Redish & Berlow, supra note 21, at 810. But they struggle 
to explain why these cases are not problematic as a matter of democratic legitimacy. To Richard 
Nagareda, “[i]t is not plausible, for example, to think that Congress . . . [would] design a remedial 
scheme that would lie fallow” solely because of a lack of economic incentive to litigate. Nagareda, 
supra note 24, at 1884. As an argument about legislative intent, this is unconvincing. Cf. Stephen B. 
Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1924, 1930 (2006) (criticizing Nagareda’s argument on somewhat different grounds). A 
congressional decision to opt for one litigation enabler, like an attorney’s fees provision or treble 
damages, could easily be read to exclude another, like class joinder. Out would go employment 
discrimination and antitrust class actions. Statutory silence on the class action issue could as easily be 
taken to mean that Congress disdains class treatment as the opposite. Moreover, Nagareda’s argument 
rests on a presumption about legislative intent. But Congress not infrequently considers the propriety 
of class enforcement during deliberations, so the rationale for a presumption is uncertain. 
 33. See generally Farhang, supra note 26 (discussing why Congress opts for private rights of 
action over public administration). 
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C. Pragmatic Balancing in Public Administration 
There are two ways to deal with this dilemma of how best to govern the 
class action. Decision-makers could opt for one of Rule 23’s conceptions. 
The Supreme Court has taken this tack recently in a couple of dramatic 
class action decisions.
34
 Alternatively, decision-makers could muddle 
through without picking sides. This strategy requires the maintenance of 
sufficient ambiguity in class action doctrine so as to enable the 
conceptions to coexist, however awkwardly. 
The second option might not seem like a strategy at all, but, in fact, 
courts have deployed something like it for the governance of other parts of 
the federal regulatory apparatus. Regulatory need and democratic 
accountability clash across the landscape of federal administrative law.
35
 
This conflict lurks in the doctrine that determines the court’s power to 
second-guess the substance of an agency’s decision.36 It surfaces in 
arguments about the unitary executive theory of administrative power.
37
 
Debates over the nondelegation doctrine fight over it.
38
 Foundational 
theorists of American public administration have argued about the 
problematic balance between regulatory efficacy and democratic 
legitimacy.
39
 In crude terms, the dilemma resembles the class action’s. The 
exercise of vast powers by agencies with tenuous connections to an 
electorate should give anyone in a democracy pause. But an insistence that 
only elected officials make regulatory decisions could sacrifice expert, 
efficient administration on the altar of democratic accountability. 
 
 
 34. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 35. Managing this clash is a significant part of administrative law’s central task. Cf. Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1263–64 (2006) (“The task of administrative law is to generate institutional designs that 
appropriately balance the simultaneous demands of political responsiveness, efficient administration, 
and respect for legal rights.”). 
 36. Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 51–56 (1983) (voiding a rule due to agency’s failure appropriately to interpret the science on 
the issue), with id. at 58–59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should allow political 
considerations more weight in evaluating agency action). 
 37. E.g., David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of 
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2008). 
 38. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141 (2004) (“The most prominent argument 
advanced by the proponents of strict nondelegation is the desirability of having public policy made by 
actors who are accountable to the people.”), with id. at 2151 (“Perhaps the argument most commonly 
invoked in support of broad delegation is the desirability of having policy formulated by persons who 
have expertise in the subject matter.”). 
 39. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 213–22 (1992). 
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In several instances, courts have eschewed a principled resolution of 
this dilemma and instead have managed it, as an ongoing contest, with a 
pragmatic balancing strategy.
40
 Judges have all but conceded that they 
cannot enforce the nondelegation doctrine directly,
41
 but they use a variety 
of indirect methods to encourage Congress to resolve certain policy issues 
before handing the lawmaking baton to agencies.
42
 The Supreme Court has 
authorized some agency independence from presidential control, but too 
much “heightens the concern that [the administrative state] may slip from 
the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”43 Hence, while 
one layer of for-cause removal protection for agency officials is 
permissible, two layers are unconstitutional. Congress can delegate to 
agencies the authority to resolve statutory ambiguities, but not when they 
involve major issues of public policy.
44
 The resulting doctrine can be 
frustratingly muddy and theoretically adrift. But these failings, such as 
they are, are all but inevitable results when the strategy is pragmatic. 
However incoherent, administrative law can serve values of democratic 
accountability and regulatory efficacy, even when those values clash. 
As class action doctrine under the modern Rule 23 coalesced in the 
1970s, decision-makers adopted a variant of this strategy to manage the 
divide between Rule 23’s regulatory and adjectival conceptions and with it 
the class action’s governance dilemma. Taking control of Rule 23 from its 
creators, who only vaguely understood its regulatory implications, judges, 
lawyers, and legislators crafted a body of doctrine by 1980 that served 
Rule 23’s competing conceptions but nonetheless stabilized class action 
law and practice. 
 
 
 40. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary 
Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9 
(2010) (describing a similar phenomenon, mostly in other areas of law). 
 41. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 42. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000); David 
Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 239, 243 (2003). 
 43. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010). 
Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (upholding a statute prohibiting the Attorney 
General, who is removable at will by the President, from firing an independent counsel except “for 
cause”), with Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (striking down a structure that imposed two layers 
of “for cause” removal protection between the President and the official). See Pildes, supra note 40, at 
12 (commenting on Free Enterprise Fund and suggesting that the line it draws is not “defin[ed] . . . 
with sharp legal precision or clarity.”). 
 44. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236–42 (2006). 
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II. RULE 23’S ORIGINS IN AN INNOCENT AGE 
Lawyers and judges throughout Rule 23’s lifetime have cared a great 
deal for authorial intentions and expectations,
45
 even as few have paused 
to explain why modern doctrine should somehow heed what Benjamin 
Kaplan or Charles Alan Wright wanted in the early 1960s.
46
 Politicizing 
Rule 23’s history for current use, advocates have offered dueling creation 
stories, each consistent with one of the device’s conceptions. To some, 
Rule 23’s authors thought their device would help create a version of the 
Great Society.
47
 Their ideological opponents insist that “the 1966 
Advisory Committee was creating a rule of procedural efficiency,” and 
that “[n]owhere did the 1966 Advisory Committee suggest that Rule 23 
was intended to deputize posses of private attorneys general . . .”48 
Neither of these claims is entirely accurate. Arthur Miller was in the 
room when the Advisory Committee wrote Rule 23, and he insists that 
“nothing was in the committee’s mind.”49 To elaborate: Rule 23’s authors 
could not possibly have anticipated the ways in which class litigation 
would contribute to public administration, since they completed their work 
on Rule 23 before the seismic shifts in American law and politics made the 
1960s The Sixties. To a significant extent, they tackled class action reform 
primarily to correct technical flaws and bring a badly shopworn procedural 
rule in line with caselaw developments. These were adjectival objectives 
that had no obvious regulatory or redistributive valence.
50
 
Still, the authors shared “[a] spirit of them versus us . . . of a fairly 
simplistic good guy-bad guy outlook on the world,”51 and they hoped that 
 
 
 45. E.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 46. I argue for the relevance of rulemaker intention in David Marcus, Institutions and an 
Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927. 
 47. E.g., Moore, Jr., supra note 20, at 842 (“The primary function of the class action is 
deterrence of harmful conduct . . . . Judicial efficiency and compensation of small claimants are merely 
desirable by-products.”). 
 48. Letter from Sheila L. Birnbaum to Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler (June 14, 1996), in 2 
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CIVIL RULE 23, at 157, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Work 
ingPapers-Vol2.pdf. 
 49. Testimony of Arthur Miller, Public Hearing: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 23, at 64 (Jan. 17, 1997), in 3 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, available at http://www.uscourts 
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol3.pdf. 
 50. Commentators writing shortly after the revisions took effect concluded thusly. E.g., Jonathan 
M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail & Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974). 
 51. John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
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Rule 23 would open courthouse doors to “small people.”52 These men 
appreciated the contribution the class action had made, as a substitute for 
government enforcement, to the desegregation cause.
53
 They understood 
their device well enough to anticipate that, for plaintiffs with “small 
claims,” “the class action [could] serve[] something like the function of an 
administrative proceeding where scattered individual interests are 
represented by the Government.”54 
A. The 1938 Rule and Its Flaws 
Deficiencies in the 1938 version of Rule 23 initially spurred the 
Advisory Committee to tackle class action reform. It provided for three 
types of class actions, distinguished by the type of “jural” relationship 
involved.
55
 A “true” class action joined “joint, or common, or secondary” 
rights alleged by the class members.
56
 This category included actions 
brought by the members of an unincorporated association vindicating an 
organizational interest,
57
 and suits by shareholders pursuing the 
corporation’s claim.58 “Hybrid” class suits aggregated the class members’ 
“several,” or individually-held, rights for reasons of equitable treatment. 
The defendant lacked sufficient resources to satisfy all claims. Rule 23 
enabled their joinder in a case, to enable per capita distributions instead of 
compensation based on a race to the courthouse.
59
 Spurious suits, the third 
category, also joined several rights, but in instances where they lacked any 
 
 
CIVIL RULE 23, at 262, 266, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
WorkingPapers-Vol2.pdf. 
 52. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 398 (1967); see also Marvin E. Frankel, 
Amended Rule 23 From a Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (quoting 
Benjamin Kaplan) (stressing “‘the class action’s historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy’” 
when asked about the class action’s purpose); Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & 
COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1968) (identifying as a chief purpose of the 1966 revisions “to provide means 
of vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to 
bring their opponents into court at all”). 
 53. Marcus, supra note 6, at 703. 
 54. Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 52, at 398. 
 55. James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 310 (1938); 
see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 246 (1950). 
 56. Moore & Cohn, supra note 55, at 309. 
 57. Hiram H. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 40–41 (1937). 
 58. Chester B. McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEO. L.J. 878, 898–99 
(1938). 
 59. JAMES WM. MOORE, JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, JOHN M. GREENFIELD, JAMES A. PIKE & HENRY G. 
FISCHER, 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§ 23.04[2], at 2239 (1938). 
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equitable connection.
60
 True and hybrid class suits generated full res 
judicata for absent class members. Only class members who opted in 
could benefit from spurious class judgments.
61
 
Theoretically anachronistic
62
 and cumbersome in application,
63
 the 
1938 rule was badly out of sync with doctrinal currents when efforts at 
revision began. Its constraints made sleight of hand necessary for courts to 
realize the broad potential of Hansberry v. Lee, which allowed res judicata 
for any judgment, provided the class members had received adequate 
representation.
64
 Judges recast spurious suits as true or hybrid when absent 
class members had enjoyed adequate representation.
65
 They held open 
absurdly lengthy opt-in periods to encourage as many absent class 
members as possible to avail themselves of favorable judgments.
66
 
Ignoring doctrinal constraints altogether, several progressive Southern 
federal judges signaled that plaintiffs’ judgments in desegregation class 
actions would benefit all black schoolchildren included in the class 
definition, even though the suits involved spurious rights.
67
 
 
 
 60. For example, a group of employees, each of whom was employed pursuant to a separate 
contract, had several rights. One employee could sue to vindicate her several right to overtime 
compensation and by no means had to tie herself to other similarly-situated employees. E.g., Pentland 
v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 61. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 63, at 406–07 (2d ed. 
1947). 
 62. In an opinion, the realist Charles Clark described the labels as “euphonious, if mystic.” 
Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 978 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Chafee, supra note 55, at 245–46 
(“Most lawyers and judges are no longer accustomed to think in this way.”). 
 63. E.g., Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1950); Martinez v. Maverick 
Cnty. Water Control and Improvement Dist., 219 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1955); Pentland, 152 F.2d at 852. 
 64. 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940); see also Arthur John Keefe, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 
327, 339 (1948). 
 65. Dickinson, 197 F.2d at 978; see also 2 PROCEEDINGS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 246 (Mar. 25, 1954) (comments of Charles Clark), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-518-1 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“I think we solved it 
beautifully . . . . We just changed the label. We called it a hybrid class suit and said that what [the 
district judge] had done was correct . . . .”). See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 52, at 
397 (observing “that courts had sometimes evidently classified actions as true in order to attain 
judgments covering the class; that they were tending to allow interventions in spurious actions 
although the limitations period would otherwise have run on the claims; that they were going to the 
length of permitting ‘one-way’ interventions”). 
 66. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587–89 (10th Cir. 1961). 
 67. Marcus, supra note 6, at 678–91. 
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B. Creating a New Rule 23 
1. The First Effort: 1953–1955 
The original Rule 23 was only a decade old when rulemakers began to 
call for its revision.
68
 Its formalism, dissatisfaction with the impoverished 
res judicata effect of most class judgments, and judge-made innovations in 
class action doctrine provoked reporter Charles Clark to put Rule 23 on 
the Advisory Committee’s agenda in May 1953.69 His suggested revision 
left the true/hybrid/spurious classifications unchanged, but it added a 
subdivision entitled “Orders to Ensure Adequate Representation.”70 This 
nod to Hansberry would signal to district judges that, if a previous court 
had ensured the adequate representation of class member interests, all 
class judgments should bind and benefit all class members.
71
 The proposal 
failed, probably due to the determined opposition of James William 
 
 
 68. Letter from George Wharton Pepper to the Honorable Charles Clark (June 25, 1948), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-5601-03 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.). 
 69. Experience Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Reporter’s Summary of Suggestions, 
Criticisms, and Published Discussions, at 41 (May 1, 1953), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-4707-02 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (summarizing similar 
criticisms of Rule 23 and referring to “criticisms listed by the Reporter in his memorandum to the 
Committee of March 17, 1950”). Clark had first suggested action on Rule 23 in an undated 
memorandum that, as best as I can tell, was probably written in 1950. Reporter’s Statement as to the 
Need for Study by the Committee of the Present Functioning of the Rules, at 13, in PAPERS OF 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT (on file with the University of Texas School of Law Library). On Clark’s 
desire to harmonize Rule 23 with caselaw developments, see, for example, Transcript, ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 107–09 (May 18, 1953) (statement of 
Clark), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-1953-
min-Vol2.pdf (using Dickinson v. Burnham to explain why Rule 23 should be revised); Transcript, 
PROCEEDINGS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 244–46 (Mar. 25, 1954) 
(statement of Clark), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-
518-01 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 70. Transcript, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 106 (May 
18, 1953), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-1953 
-min-Vol2.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 121 (statement of Clark) (“[T]here is no question . . . that it is expected that the 
judgment when entered will be res judicata. That is the idea. . . . [T]he thesis of the Supreme Court in 
the Hansberry v. Lee case [sic] is not based upon the idea of theoretical rights, whether joint or 
otherwise, but is based on the propriety of the representation . . . .”); Charles Alan Wright, 
Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 
521, 540 (1954) (arguing that there is “no support to the view that the Committee intends to make such 
a fundamental change as to bind the absentees in all class actions[,]” but that “the courts would do well 
to . . . reexamine for themselves the notion that an absent member of a class, whose interests have been 
fairly and vigorously represented, is not bound by the judgment merely because his is the ‘several’ 
right of the ‘spurious’ class action . . . .”). 
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Moore, the father of the original class action.
72
 He particularly feared that 
parties would use the remade device in mass accident cases.
73
 Work ended 
in 1956, when the Supreme Court abruptly disbanded the committee for 
unexplained reasons.
74
 
Nothing substantive surfaces in the records of Clark’s and his 
colleagues’ deliberations, even as a few perspicacious commentators had 
made some of them aware of the class action’s regulatory potential.75 It is 
hard to imagine what agenda these men would have harbored in 1953 
beyond concerns that a procedural device work properly. School 
desegregation was the great class action cause of Rule 23’s pre-modern 
era,
76
 but the Supreme Court did not decide Brown v. Board of Education 
until a year after the committee began its deliberations. The fundamental 
shifts of law and politics that later gave Rule 23 its regulatory portfolio lay 
in its hazy future. 
2. The Second Effort: 1962–1964 
The Supreme Court restarted the Advisory Committee, with all new 
membership, in 1960.
77
 When it met for the first time, chairman Dean 
 
 
 72. Moore objected publicly to the reform. DISSENT, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, at 7 (1955), available at 
www.uscourts.gov (objecting that the proposed rule “will stir more problems concerning res judicata 
than it settles”). Charles Alan Wright blamed Moore’s opposition to the proposed amendments, 
including the amendment to Rule 23, for their failure in the Supreme Court. Letter from Charles Alan 
Wright to Richard H. Field, at 1 (Nov. 20, 1956), in PAPERS OF CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT (on file with 
the University of Texas School of Law Library) (stating that Moore was “principally responsible for 
the Court’s failure to act”). 
 73. Transcript, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 157–58 
(Mar. 1955), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-523-55 
(Cong. Info. Serv.); Transcript, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 
111 (May 18, 1953), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ 
CV05-1953-min-Vol2.pdf. 
 74. Discharge of Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956); see also Brooke D. Coleman, 
Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 276–
77 (2009). 
 75. Irving A. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 
42 ILL. L. REV. 518, 518–20 (1947); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary 
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 717 (1941) (discussing the notion of a private 
attorney general and the regulatory potential of a class action); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 
979 n.4 (2d Cir. 1952) (describing favorably the academic critique of Rule 23). Cf. George D. 
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The “Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658, 
663 (1956) (arguing that the value of class actions lies in their “therapeutic” potential to “help[] 
maintain the health of our corporate system” through deterrence). 
 76. Article by Earl Warren, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1972. 
 77. Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 4, 1960), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/SC_Press_Release.1960.pdf. 
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Acheson suggested that it start where the earlier efforts had ended,
78
 
indicating that Rule 23 owed its place on the reform agenda to the 
adjectival concerns of the previous members. Led by reporter Benjamin 
Kaplan, the committee began work on Rule 23 in 1962.
79
 As Charles Alan 
Wright recalled a few years after the fact, “[t]he principal reason for 
rewriting Rule 23 in 1966 was to get away from the conceptually-defined 
categories of the old rule.”80 Put differently, the job was to craft a cleaner, 
more flexible rule that better reflected how some courts had begun to use 
the class action device.
81
 
In his initial review of the prior committee’s work, Kaplan voiced the 
same concerns Clark had raised, and expressed sympathy with Clark’s 
efforts and the academic criticism of Rule 23’s analytical structure.82 He 
insisted that the new committee go further, though, for any retention of the 
true/hybrid/spurious classifications would invite confused judicial 
inquiries into a judgment’s proper scope.83 From the start, Kaplan 
suggested an entirely rewritten Rule 23 that stressed adequate 
representation and class solidarity as conditions for aggregate treatment.
84
 
The point, Kaplan reiterated repeatedly, was both to harmonize Rule 23 
 
 
 78. Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to the Chairman and Members of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, at 1 (Nov. 3, 1960), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on 
CIS No. CI-6701-03 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (noting that “[t]he Chairman’s call for the first meeting of the 
Committee . . . lists as one of the Committee’s tasks the consideration of recommendations made by 
the former Advisory Committee in October 1955”). 
 79. See Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Benjamin Kaplan (Apr. 3, 1962), in RECORDS OF 
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6301-28 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (alluding to 
a “draft report” that contains a suggestion for a Rule 23 revision); Minutes, MEETING OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, at 11 (Dec. 5, 1960), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV12-1960-min.pdf (suggesting that the Committee 
postpone efforts to revise Rule 23); John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 
on Class Actions (Dec. 20, 1996), in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 262, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol2.pdf (observing that “the basic committee work” 
on Rule 23 “was done in 1962 and 1963”). 
 80. Cf. Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 177 (1969). In several instances, for 
example, judges all but insisted that spurious class judgments bind all adequately represented class 
members, whether they opted in or not. 
 81. E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588–90 (10th Cir. 1961). 
 82. Kaplan Letter, supra note 78, at 3. 
 83. Id. at V-4 (referring to Clark’s proposal as “not a complete solution and . . . even a confusing 
half-measure if the approach of Rule 23 is fundamentally wrong”). 
 84. TOPIC EE: TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS—
RULE 23, at EE-2 (1962), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. 
CI-6309-44 (Cong. Info Serv.). 
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with developments in the caselaw and to enable future judicial 
experimentation with collective claims processing.
85
 
Other than desegregation,
86
 no substantive concern surfaced in 
committee deliberations. Had committee members harbored specific hopes 
for Rule 23’s regulatory consequences, they surely would have surfaced in 
the prolonged debate that preceded its promulgation. Kaplan’s draft 
attracted persistent dissent, particularly from committee member John 
Frank.
87
 He feared “the loss of individual liberty” that a broadly preclusive 
class judgment would entail,
88
 and he worried that unscrupulous lawyers 
would collude to settle cases cheaply and give defendants classwide 
preclusion at an unjust discount.
89
 But he made no mention of the new 
Rule 23’s regulatory capacity, even as he presciently identified difficulties 
 
 
 85. Transcript, MEETING OF THE FEDERAL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at 20 (Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 
1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.) (“over-vehement”); id. at 2 (referring to Nisley). 
 86. Frank, supra note 51, at 262, 266 (“If there was a single, undoubted goal of the committee, 
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class 
action system which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly, segregation.”). See generally Marcus, 
supra note 6, at 702–07 (describing how the Advisory Committee drafted part of Rule 23 to assist 
plaintiffs in desegregation litigation); Pamela A. MacLean, The History: From Desegregation to 
Silicon Gel Implantation, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 22, 1996, at 9. 
 87. I refer to Frank’s criticisms because he spearheaded the opposition to Rule 23(b)(3) and 
contributed the chief substantive critiques. In several memoranda, Kaplan and Sacks summarized for 
committee members comments they had received on the proposed revisions. Each discusses Frank’s 
opposition but virtually no other committee member’s. DISCUSSION OF RESPONSES TO MEMORANDUM 
(Dec. 2, 1963), at 6–7, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-
7003-08 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (discussing Frank’s opposition to Rule 23(b)(3) and noting that another 
committee member is “sympathetic” to it); Memorandum of Additional Points on Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments of, at 5 (Mar. 15, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
microformed on CIS No. CI-7001-46 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (discussing Frank’s criticism of Rule 
23(b)(3)). 
 88. Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, at 3 (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312-20 (Cong. Info. Serv.); see also Letter from 
John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, at 2 (Jan. 16, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
microformed on CI-7003-21 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“When individuals are losing rights to prosecute their 
own lawsuits, the system should not run so smoothly.”); Transcript, supra note 85, at 8 (statement of 
Frank) (expressing concern that the class action “deprives a citizen of his right to his trial and to his 
day in court”). 
 89. JOHN P. FRANK, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES: DISSENTING VIEW OF COMMITTEE 
MEMBER (May 28, 1965), at 2, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS 
No. CI-7107-01 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“The corruption potential of the binding spurious class action 
intimidates me. These cases are terribly easy to rig—a bright child could do it. I would not hold out the 
bait.”); Frank (1964), supra note 88, at 2 (“The fraud potential in spurious class actions made res 
judicata is simply tremendous. It is practical child’s play for some business which wishes to escape the 
consequences of its acts to have a suit brought by a dummy who purports to represent a class, let him 
lose it, and thus escape responsibility.”). 
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that Rule 23 would later cause.
90
 Indeed, Frank feared that the amended 
rule would add an arrow to the defendant’s quiver.91 No one else grasped 
Rule 23’s substantive implications, at least in any concrete way, any 
better.
92
 The proposal provoked little public comment,
93
 and the reactions 
that trickled in showed almost no appreciation for the new rule’s 
redistributive or regulatory potential.
94
 
Participants in the rulemaking process did not anticipate and debate 
Rule 23’s specific substantive implications for an obvious reason. The 
dizzying array of substantive, political, and cultural changes that 
transformed Rule 23 from a mere joinder rule into a regulatory icon began 
after—in some instances only months after—the rule took final form in 
February 1964.
95
 Arthur Miller identified several of these developments 
when he made this point in 1979.
96
 Title VII, the substantive grist for the 
employment discrimination class action mill, went into force on July 2, 
1964.
97
 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, whose derivation of an implied right of 
 
 
 90. In particular, Frank worried that defendants and their insurers in mass accident cases would 
collude with a pushover plaintiffs’ lawyer to settle tort claims cheaply. E.g., Rabiej, supra note 6, at 
341–43. 
 91. E.g., Transcript, supra note 85, at 51 (statement of Bill Moore) (“I can’t think of anything 
nicer for the general counsel” of a corporate defendant facing significant tort liability “than your class 
suit rule.”); id. at 50 (statement of John Frank) (“It would be only the insurance companies” that would 
benefit from Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 92. Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INDUS. & 
COM. L. REV. 501, 503 (1969) (“The implications of the amended Rule came as a surprise to many 
lawyers.”). 
 93. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 1 (Apr. 24, 1965), in RECORDS OF 
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7107-05 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“I was 
surprised that these proposals have elicited so little comment from the profession.”).  
 94. A few commentators vaguely referred to Rule 23’s redistributive potential. E.g., Letter from 
William R. Fishman to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 1 (Aug. 6, 1964), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7013-09 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.) (“This is most beneficial as it will enable an uninformed indigent plaintiff to recover because of 
the vigilance of only one member of his class.”). Notably, however, the American College of Trial 
Lawyers, which mounted a scathing and high-profile attack on Rule 23 in 1972, criticized the revisions 
solely on grounds of individual autonomy. Compare SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS OF THE BOARD OF 
REGENTS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS PERTAINING TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURTS, at 17–19 (Apr. 26, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on 
CIS No. CI-7007-73 (Cong. Info. Serv.), with AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FRCP (1972). 
 95. For the rule in early 1964, see PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, RULE 23, at EE-2-EE-5 (Feb. 25, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-32 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 96. Arthur R. Miller, Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class 
Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670–76 (1979). 
 97. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION 23 (4th ed. 2007). The first class action 
under Title VII was filed in 1965. See Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A 
Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225, 229 (1976). 
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action spurred the securities fraud class action, was decided on June 8, 
1964.
98
 The late 1960s public interest movement, which scored a stunning 
array of legislative victories in Congress that fueled the fledgling class 
action, began to pick up speed in 1965.
99
 The supply of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
eager to file class action suits increased as no-fault schemes for 
automobile accidents left attorneys looking for work, and as law schools 
began to graduate large numbers of public-spirited lawyers in the late 
1960s.
100
 
Additional changes that happened with eerie coincidence just as the ink 
dried on the proposed rule should be added to Miller’s list. Building on the 
California Supreme Court’s adoption of strict liability for product defects 
in 1963,
101
 the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, released in 1965,
102
 and thereby contributed to the substantive 
foundation for the mass tort class action.
103
 Rule 23 benefited from a 
propitious political climate that emerged abruptly in the mid-1960s. To 
Richard Hofstadter, commenting in 1964, “[t]he existence and the 
workings of the corporations are largely accepted, and in the main they are 
assumed to be fundamentally benign.’”104 If public opinion is any guide, 
business’s fall from political grace began the very next year.105 By 1971 its 
defenders feared that they had lost the American public.
106
 At the same 
time, confidence in public administration, the New Deal-era regulatory 
 
 
 98. 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1301, 1314–15 (2008). 
 99. Patrick J. Akard, Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of U.S. 
Economic Policy in the 1970s, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 597, 601 (1992). 
 100. Miller, supra note 96, at 674–75. 
 101. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (1963). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a (1965). 
 103. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, 145–47 (2008) (connecting the ALI’s regime for strict liability with some 
of the great mass torts of the 1970s and 1980s, each of which would be litigated in part as class 
actions). See generally Robert L. Rabin, Harms from Exposure to Toxic Substances: The Limits of 
Liability Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 419, 419–22 (2011) (describing developments in tort doctrine, starting 
with the Restatement, that created the substantive foundation for mass tort class litigation). 
 104. DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA 
33 (1989) (quoting Richard Hofstadter). 
 105. MARK ALAN SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, 
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 101 (2000) (charting public approval of corporations from 1953–1996); 
Mark Alan Smith, Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation within a Market Economy: Does the 
Structural Power of Business Undermine Popular Sovereignty?, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 842, 850 (1999) 
(graphing business’s declining political fortunes starting in the late 1960s). 
 106. Powell Memo, supra note 12. 
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preference, dissipated.
107
 Unchecked by prostrate business interests, 
motivated by a public interest agenda, but wary of agency politicization 
and capture,
108
 Congress in the late 1960s frequently turned to private 
rights of action, often enforced through class actions, to implement the 
new regulatory schemes it crafted.
109
 
Given that members worked right before the tipping point, the fact that 
technical procedural concerns dominated committee deliberations is hardly 
surprising. Nonetheless, members’ imaginations about the class action’s 
future went beyond the adjectival conception’s limits. Class actions were a 
litigation backwater when they began work,
110
 but they seemed to have 
some sense that their obscure rule would assume far greater importance 
going forward. There is no dispute that committee members had a 
regulatory conception in mind for at least part of their new device. Some 
of them had closely tracked Rule 23’s use as an aid to desegregation 
lawsuits, the only real tool for civil rights enforcement before the 1964 
Civil Rights Act empowered federal agencies to intervene.
111
 Members 
designed Rule 23(b)(2) expressly for this cause.
112
 Also, Kaplan and his 
allies on the committee drafted Rule 23(b)(3) with litigation like Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
113
 an important antitrust case, in 
mind.
114
 Since such actions would become “more and more almost the 
staple of federal litigation,”115 Kaplan asserted, he wanted a flexible rule to 
ensure that the “line of thought” they sensed in the case law but could not 
exactly describe would continue to develop.
116
 Hence several members 
 
 
 107. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1060 (1997); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 724 (1986); Thomas K. McGraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 159, 164 (1975); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest 
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 225 (1976). 
 108. Vogel, supra note 104, at 40; Harold W. Stanley, Southern Partisan Changes: Dealignment, 
Realignment, or Both?, 50 J. POLITICS 64, 65 (1988); Richard Fleisher & John R. Bond, The Shrinking 
Middle in the US Congress, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 429, 435 (2004) (describing the beginnings of 
polarization in the Democratic and Republican parties in the 1970s); Keith T. Poole & Howard 
Rosenthal, The Polarization of American Politics, 46 J. POLITICS 1061, 1068 (1984); Smith, American 
Business, supra note 105, at 105 (charting the increased polarization of Congress starting in 1965). 
 109. Farhang, supra note 26, at 5. 
 110. For a similar sense of the history, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1487 (2008). 
 111. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
50 (1991). 
 112. Marcus, supra note 6, at 702–11. 
 113. 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961). 
 114. Transcript, supra note 49, at 6. 
 115. Id. at 6. 
 116. Id. at 11. 
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were disappointed in 1969, when the Supreme Court’s crabbed take on 
class action jurisdiction diminished Rule 23’s force as an instrument for 
consumer protection.
117
 
Present-day advocates would be well-advised to stop seeking 
advantage in Rule 23’s origins. Too much water has passed under the 
bridge. In 1966, Charles Alan Wright predicted that Rule 23(b)(3), by far 
the most consequential part of the rule, would have little impact.
118
 
Wright’s error was reasonable given the instability of American law and 
politics at the time. At the risk of aggrandizing Rule 23’s significance to 
the American Republic, a historical comparison is helpful. When Pat 
Brown won the California gubernatorial election in 1962, a testy Richard 
Nixon, Brown’s vanquished adversary, gave what he called his last press 
conference and famously told reporters that they wouldn’t “‘have Nixon to 
kick around anymore.’”119 Two years later, Lyndon Johnson crushed Barry 
Goldwater’s quixotic chase for the presidency, winning the largest 
percentage of the popular vote in American history. In 1968, Johnson lost 
the New Hampshire primary, pulled his reelection bid, and turned the 
White House over to Nixon. Things changed fast in the 1960s. The 
Advisory Committee wrote Rule 23 in an innocent world. It would take 
root in a fallen one. 
III. THE POLITICS OF RULE 23, 1967–1980 
Before the 1960s ended, the now-hardened battle lines in the war over 
Rule 23 formed, with clashes erupting over the same alleged legal and 
economic pathologies that fuel debates today. “Predictions of 
Gotterdamerung are not lightly to be made,” Simon Rifkind said of class 
actions in 1970, and yet torrents of such overheated claims, about the 
imminent demise of class actions or the existential threat they posed to 
 
 
 117. On Snyder v. Harris, see infra notes 124–29 and accompanying text. Charles Alan Wright 
complained that Snyder “emasculated” Rule 23. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Joseph Tidings 
(June 17, 1969), in Class Action Jurisdiction Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements 
in Judicial Machinery of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 
93–94 (1969). Benjamin Kaplan also thought that Snyder was hostile to Rule 23’s design. Adequacy of 
Consumer Redress Mechanisms: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumers of the 
Committee on Commerce and the Subcommittee on the Representation of Citizens’ Interests of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1973), (statement of 
Robert Braucher) (reporting that Kaplan “did not regard Snyder . . . as a sympathetic handling of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
 118. Charles Alan Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 
552, 567 (1966). 
 119. Gladwin Hill, Nixon Denounces Press as Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1962, at 1, 18 (quoting 
Richard Nixon). 
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American capitalism, came throughout the decade.
120
 If policymakers 
trying to respond had succeeded, Rule 23 would not have survived its first 
fifteen years. 
The class action wars of the 1970s have historical significance for at 
least two reasons. First, combatants quickly exhausted virtually every 
claim for and against an invigorated Rule 23. Debates since have consisted 
largely of recycled doctrinal and rhetorical claims, suggesting either the 
stability of class action doctrine or the limits of the lawyer’s imagination 
(or both). Second, combatants’ arguments can be readily organized around 
the regulatory/adjectival fault line, indicating its centrality to the structure 
of class action law and politics. Indeed, the divide significantly influenced 
the major efforts to reform class action law in the 1970s. 
A. The Emergence of the Class Action Wars 
Rule 23’s regulatory significance was obvious to all by 1969. That 
year, Wright conceded that he badly erred with his prediction about Rule 
23(b)(3),
121
 Ralph Nader hailed “the exquisite congruence of sanction and 
relief that is implicit in the consumer class action,”122 and congressmen 
championed Rule 23 as a substitute for a captured and inefficient federal 
bureaucracy.
123
 By that autumn, the federal class action would sink into 
partisan muck. In March, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Harris, 
depriving federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over most state law 
class actions and thereby weakening Rule 23 as a weapon for the cause of 
consumer protection.
124
 Sen. Joseph Tydings quickly introduced a bill to 
reverse the decision.
125
 To Tydings’ “delight,” the new Nixon 
Administration lent its “wholehearted[] support.”126 At hearings on the bill 
 
 
 120. Consumer Protection Act of 1970: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., on S. 3201, at 381 (1970). 
 121. Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969). 
 122. Class Action Jurisdiction Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 34 (1969) 
(statement of Ralph Nader). 
 123. Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Tydings) (identifying consumer class actions as a response to 
failed administrative agencies); Joseph D. Tydings, S. 1980—The Class Action Jurisdiction Act, 4 
PORTIA L.J. 83, 83–85 (introducing an article arguing for expanded federal jurisdiction for class 
actions by describing a failure of the Federal Trade Commission to regulate effectively). 
 124. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 125. Class Action Jurisdiction Act, supra note 122, at 4–5 (providing text of S. 1980, the “Class 
Action Jurisdiction Act”). 
 126. Id. at 19, 21; see also Editorial, Your Money Back, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1969, at 40 
(praising the administration’s bill as good for consumers). 
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in July, not a single witness testified against it,
127
 and even the Wall Street 
Journal’s editorial page gave its (admittedly tepid) blessing that 
September.
128
 
This “honeymoon” period soon ended.129 At the end of October, the 
Nixon Administration pivoted sharply and proposed a much more 
restrictive alternative to Tydings’ bill.130 Maurice Stans, Nixon’s Secretary 
of Commerce and a “hard-lobbying, cheerleading advocate” for business, 
had won an internal administration fight over class action legislation.
131
 
Consumer advocates like Nader cried foul,
132
 and Tydings denounced the 
bill as itself “a consumer fraud.”133 Warren Magnuson, a class action 
champion in the Senate, excoriated Nixon’s chief consumer protection 
official for exercising her “woman’s prerogative”134 when she did her best 
to defend her boss’s alternative against the bill she had previously 
supported.
135
 When hearings on the competing bills commenced in early 
1970, an army of business lobbyists mustered.
136
 They lobbed charges at 
Rule 23 that became the standard set of rhetorical grenades for the class 
action wars from that point on. Class actions posed a “grave economic 
 
 
 127. Class Action Jurisdiction Act Hearings, supra note 122. 
 128. Consumer Power?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1969, at 22 (preferring class action legislation over 
“still more regulatory bureaucracies”). 
 129. The Morton Eisen Case: Granddaddy of Them All, JURIS DOCTOR, Jan. 1974, at 20–21. 
 130. The bill only created federal jurisdiction for eleven types of claims, and it required that the 
Department of Justice successfully terminate its own enforcement action before a private litigant could 
bring a class action in federal court. Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Proposes a “Bill of Rights” for 
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1969, at 1; Richard Nixon, Special Address to the Congress on 
Consumer Protection (Oct. 30, 1969). 
 131. The Stans Style, TIME MAG., Aug. 2, 1971, at 58; see also John D. Morris, Nixon Consumer 
Plans Due, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1969, at 1, 38; Class Action and Other Consumer Protection 
Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Reps, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., at 212 (1970) (statement of 
Richard McLaren, Associate Attorney General for Antitrust) (arguing that “we just can’t throw 
business to the wolves on this”). 
 132. The U.S.’s Toughest Customer, TIME MAG., Dec. 12, 1969, at 89. 
 133. Joseph D. Tydings, The Private Bar—Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 478, 480 (1970). 
 134. Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971, Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 
United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., on H.R. 18515, at 30 (1970). 
 135. John D. Morris, Nixon Bill Authorizes Consumer Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1969, at 1, 30 
(quoting Virginia Knauer, Nixon’s Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, as praising a bill that 
would liberalize subject matter jurisdiction requirements for class actions because it helps “‘enlist[] the 
services of the private bar in the fight for consumer protection’”). 
 136. Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, United States Senate, 
91st Cong., 2d. Sess., on S. 2246, S. 3092, and S. 3201, at iii (1970) (listing witnesses). 
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hazard to business”137 because they enabled plaintiffs to extort unjustified 
settlements,
138
 encouraged strike suits,
139
 and so forth. 
The temperature of the public debate never again cooled, as a few 
examples from a rich trove of rhetorical excess illustrate. Columbia 
professor and corporate lawyer Milton Handler, a persistent critic of class 
action expansionism, lampooned his adversaries as overwrought fanatics 
who treated him and his allies as “disciple[s] of the devil.”140 Beverly 
Moore, a one-time Nader Raider and plaintiffs’ bar fixture, described 
Handler and his ilk as “lavishly paid defense buffoons.”141 To its 
defenders, the new Rule 23 could pacify restive youth angry about 
Vietnam, who without it would “throw[] bricks through the windows of 
the presidents of their respective colleges.”142 A spokesman for business 
interests insisted that the closet Marxists on the plaintiffs’ side wanted “to 
literally dismember large numbers of business enterprises . . . .”143 
(Admittedly, at least one of the country’s premier class action litigators 
was, in fact, a lifelong socialist.)
144
 A defense lawyer, disgusted by the 
status of class action litigation circa 1976, could barely contain his 
umbrage: “It is not the finest hour of a profession that produced a Lord 
Coke to challenge the Crown, and a David Dudley Field to challenge the 
right of even a Lincoln to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.”145 
The contest over the proper conception of Rule 23 lay at the heart of 
this bitter, if overwrought, debate, even if participants did not express 
themselves in these terms.
146
 The normative implications of the adjectival 
conception surfaced in the arguments advocates of a restrained class action 
 
 
 137. Id. at 306. 
 138. Id. at 288 (statement of Milton Handler, Professor, Columbia Law School). 
 139. Id. at 447 (statement of George W. Koch, Grocery Manufacturers of America); id. at 492 
(statement of National Association of Manufacturers). 
 140. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The 
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1971). 
 141. Beverly C. Moore, Jr., The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS ACT. REP. 
47, 51 (1974). 
 142. Harold E. Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action as a Social Instrument, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 288, 
289 (1971). 
 143. Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Reps, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 288 (1970) (statement of Thomas Rothwell, National Small 
Business Association). 
 144. Spencer Klaw, Abe Pomerantz is Watching You, FORTUNE, Feb. 1968, at 144, 146. 
 145. Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 
F.R.D. 199, 207 (1976). 
 146. For contemporaneous observations along these lines, see Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: 
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48 (1975); 
Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975). 
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voiced. Litigants and courts should not use Rule 23 alchemy to alter the 
substance of claims. When judges ignored or downplayed individualized 
elements of securities or antitrust claims in order to certify classes, for 
example, they engaged in illegitimate substantive law reform.
147
 The fact 
that so few certified class actions went to trial was an indictment of Rule 
23, because it meant that a mere joinder rule fundamentally altered the 
standard civil process.
148
 Rule 23 had no legitimate charge to generate 
claims that otherwise would go un-filed.
149
 Because Rule 23’s regulatory 
role was incidental at best, a deterrence benefit class actions promised 
could not justify the vast gulf between attorney’s fees awarded and per 
capita class member recoveries.
150
 Negative-value class suits did not 
elevate federal judges into imperious jurists superintending fundamental 
structural reform but rather degraded them to the level of small claims 
courts.
151
 
In contrast, advocates for an expansive, powerful class action 
celebrated Rule 23 as a regulatory alternative to “the vagaries of 
administrative competence and vigor.”152 The regulatory portfolio Rule 23 
shouldered justified alterations to the standard civil process, they 
 
 
 147. E.g., Milton Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 
(1972); William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 386 
(1973); AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94, at 18; Marvin 
Schwartz, The Class Action: Its Incidence and the Eisen Cases, 29 BUS. LAW. 155, 156 (1973). 
 148. E.g., Consumer Protection: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Commerce, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 398 (1970) (statement of Richard W. 
Barrett, Grocery Manufacturers of America); AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 94, at 15–16. 
 149. E.g., Earl E. Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule 
23, 28 BUS. LAW. 741, 742 (1973); Schwartz, supra note 147, at 156; Reform of Class Action 
Litigation Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Judicial Machinery of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Cong., at 2 (1978) (statement of Griffin Bell); Consumer 
Protection: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, United 
States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 289 (1970) (statement of Milton Handler); REDRESS OF 
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, REPORT OF THE NAT’L INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE 46 (1973) 
(dissenting statement of Ira M. Milstein). 
 150. See Throwing Out the Baby With the Bathwater, FORBES, Apr. 15, 1974, at 59 (including 
details of the settlement); see also Consumer Protection Act of 1970: Hearings Before the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., on S. 3201, at 18 (1970) (statement of 
Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust). Compare Handler, supra note 140, with 
Marshall B. Grossman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1971, at F14 (letter to the editor from 
one of the Playboy Club plaintiffs’ lawyers challenging Handler’s attack on the settlement). 
 151. Peter Vanderwicken, The Angry Young Lawyers, FORTUNE, Sept. 1971, at 74, 127. 
 152. Consumer Protection Act: Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 3201, 91st 
Cong., 2d. Sess., Rpt. No. 91-1124, at 16 (1970); see also Beverly C. Moore, Jr., The Potential 
Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS ACT. REP. 47, 62 (1974) (conceiving of Rule 23 as an 
alternative to the “captive cartelists” who composed the federal bureaucracy). 
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maintained.
153
 Because cases concerned the broad implementation of the 
substantive law on behalf of classes in society, not individual claims, 
courts should not obsess over the sort of individual causation and damages 
issues that could thwart aggregate processing.
154
 Complaints about the 
mismatch between large counsel fees and small per capita recoveries 
misfired, because deterrence, as the class action’s raison d’étre, provided 
the appropriate measuring stick.
155
 
B. Efforts at Class Action Reform 
Feeling the heat, rulemakers and legislators made several efforts in the 
1970s at wholesale class action reform. After trying throughout the 
decade, the Advisory Committee ultimately abandoned its attempts to 
revise Rule 23. Its members appreciated the normative significance of the 
device’s competing conceptions, but they found themselves institutionally 
incapable of resolving the conflict. When the Carter Administration took 
over, it proposed to solve the class action problem by replacing much of 
Rule 23 with two forms of aggregate processing, one pegged to each of the 
two conceptions. 
 
 
 153. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976). 
 154. E.g., Robert A. Shlachter, The Case for Fluid Recovery, 1 CLASS ACT. RPTR. 70, 76 (1972); 
Beverly C. Moore, Jr., The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS ACT. RPTR. 47, 63 
(1974); Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Citizens and 
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 59 (1978) (statement of Beverly Moore); Maxwell W. Blecher, Is the Class Action 
Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff’s Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 373 (1973); Note, Managing the Large 
Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 451 (1973); Herbert B. Newberg, 
Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 230 
(1973). Cf. Arthur R. Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Rule 
23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 504–06 (1972) (arguing that difficulties of determining individual damages 
should not preclude class certification and arguing that courts should use statistical formulas, among 
other solutions, to deal with this problem). 
 155. Blecher, supra note 154, at 369; Scott, Two Models, supra note 146, at 943–44; Abraham L. 
Pomerantz, Class Suits Defended: Actions Protect Stockholder and Small Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 1971, at F22; Daniel J. Meador, Proposed Revision of Class Damage Procedures, 65 A.B.A. J. 48, 
49 (1979) (observing that “it has now become clear that the primary interest [of the class action] . . . is 
that of the public in preventing the wrongdoer from profiting from the illegality and in deterring 
similar conduct by others. Compensation for those injured is secondary”); Abraham Pomerantz, New 
Developments in Class Actions—Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 BUS. LAW. 1259, 1261 
(1970); Inaccurate and Unfair Billing Practices: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Credit of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 
1st Sess., at 166 (1973) (statement of Mark Silbergard); Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262, 1267 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (justifying an award of counsel fees in a securities class action with the “corporate therapy” 
the litigation provided). 
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1. Efforts in the Advisory Committee 
In September 1971, Warren Burger, no class action fan,
156
 asked the 
Advisory Committee to consider alterations to Rule 23.
157
 Soon thereafter, 
the American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL), a prominent defense-
oriented group, issued a notable report that found a receptive judicial 
audience.
158
 The ACTL catalogued every major critique of Rule 23: the 
rule generated blackmail settlements, it produced distortions in the 
substantive law, it clogged the federal judiciary with remedial minutiae, 
and it illegitimately generated claims.
159
 Among the significant changes 
the group included the reactionary suggestion that class members should 
have to opt in to benefit from a judgment.
160
 Also, foreshadowing a change 
the Advisory Committee proposed two decades later,
161
 the ACTL 
proposed a “just ain’t worth it” provision, to discourage certification 
whenever “the likelihood that damages to be recovered by individual class 
members . . . are so minimal as not to warrant the intervention of the 
court.”162 Plaintiffs’ lawyers excoriated the ACTL’s report as a “most 
intemperate and inaccurate”163 “‘cry baby’ complaint about Rule 23.”164 
But the ACTL report resonated with some Advisory Committee members, 
who took its proposed amendments, including the opt-in idea, seriously.
165
 
Proposals like these and reactions to them reflected Rule 23’s 
normative divide. To the ACTL, Rule 23 promised judicial economy, not 
 
 
 156. Warren Weaver, Jr., Blunting a Weapon of Protest, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1973, at 237; One 
for All, TIME MAG., Dec. 13, 1971. 
 157. MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES at 2 (1971), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV09-1971-min.pdf. 
 158. AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94; see also J. Vernon 
Patrick, Jr. & Marvin Cherner, Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages: A Reply to the Report of the 
American College of Trial Lawyers, 28 BUS. LAW. 1097, 1097–98 (1973) (describing the college’s 
makeup). The deference paid to the ACTL report by judges disenchanted with Rule 23 indicates its 
impact. E.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 468 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1973); Herbst v. 
Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 
1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 137 (D. Kan. 1972), aff’d sub 
nom. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 159. AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94, at 6–7, 9, 15, 18.  
 160. Id. at 30.  
 161. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 42 (1996), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1996.pdf. 
 162. AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94, at 25. 
 163. Patrick, Jr. & Cherner, supra note 158, at 1097; see also id. at 1101 (chastising the ACTL for 
basing its arguments on upon “a false premise: that the class action is only intended to achieve judicial 
economy and to promote uniformity of decisions”). 
 164. Kohn, supra note 142, at 290. 
 165. MAY 1978 ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, AGENDA ITEMS 3, in Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference, microformed on CIS No. CI-6504-31 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:587 
 
 
 
 
regulatory aggrandizement or large-scale redistribution through 
litigation.
166
 If not deployed narrowly for joinder purposes alone, the rule 
wasted “judicial time, effort, and expense,” and caused the “sacrific[e of] 
procedural and substantive fairness to the party opposing the class.”167 
When a high-profile committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York issued a rejoinder to the ACTL’s report,168 dissenting members 
complained that the majority had “overlooked the essentially procedural 
nature of Rule 23” with its “laudatory but uncomfortably vague” 
enthusiasm for the class action’s regulatory potential.169 
The Advisory Committee struggled throughout the decade to respond 
to these pressures. It debated a few medium-bore suggestions, including a 
proposed amendment to lessen notice obligations in Rule 23(b)(3) cases,
170
 
and one that would explicitly prohibit any merits inquiry at the 
certification stage.
171
 But mostly the committee foundered. Hoping that 
empirical study would pave the road to reform,
172
 members in 1977 
 
 
 166. AMERICAN COLLEGE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 94, at 6–7. 
 167. Id. at 6. 
 168. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CLASS ACTIONS—
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS AND PROPOSED OPT-IN REQUIREMENTS 
(July 17, 1973), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7507-
57 (Cong. Info. Serv.). Committee members who signed onto the majority report, which favored 
leaving Rule 23 alone, included Alvin Hellerstein, Pierre Laval, and Charles Sifton, all future judges, 
and Edward Labaton, one of the country’s premier plaintiffs’-side securities litigators. Joseph 
McLaughlin, a prominent defense-side litigator and a member of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers, signed onto a minority report that was much less favorable to the 1966 rule. See E-mail from 
Edward Labaton to David Marcus (Apr. 9, 2012) (on file with the author). 
 169. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 168, at 25–26 (“The 
Committee has, in our view, overlooked the essentially procedural nature of Rule 23 in concluding that 
the Rule should function to ‘deter’ potential wrongdoers and to ‘purify’ business and securities 
practices. If such laudatory but uncomfortably vague ideals are to be enforced by the Courts, then it is 
Congress that should enact the necessary legislation and not the rule-making bodies of the Judicial 
Conference.”). 
 170. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING, AGENDA ITEMS 4 (Feb. 22, 1974), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6503-13 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.). 
 171. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING, AGENDA ITEMS 1 (Apr. 21–22, 1975), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6503-73 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.). 
 172. Bernard Ward, the committee’s reporter after Kaplan stepped down, was supposed to begin a 
study of class action fundamentals in 1971. MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES 2 (Sept. 21, 1971), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Minutes/CV09-1971-min.pdf. Apparently, he did not do so because the American Bar 
Foundation agreed to do one. But the American Bar Foundation then postponed its study, leaving the 
committee to its own devices. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING, AGENDA ITEMS 1 
(Feb. 22, 1974), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6503-
13 (Cong. Info. Serv.); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AGENDA (May, 17, 1976), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6504-05 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.). 
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surveyed nearly 2000 judges, lawyers, and professors for their attitudes 
toward Rule 23 and for their reactions to several proposed revisions.
173
 But 
the results, some of which Tables I and II summarize, revealed nothing 
more than partisan conflict and confusion. 
TABLE I: ATTITUDES TOWARD RULE 23 
 
  
 
 
 173. Memorandum for Members of the Legal Profession Experienced in Rule 23 Matters, 1, 3 
(Mar. 29, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6505-
25 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Louis Oberdorfer, Remarks Given at the May 27, 1977, Meeting of the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (July 21, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6505-47 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
Question U.S. Circuit 
Judges 
 
U.S. District 
Judges 
 
Plaintiffs’ 
Attorneys 
Defense Attorneys 
 Accurate Not 
Accurate 
Accurate Not 
Accurate 
Accurate Not 
Accurate 
Accurate Not 
Accurate 
“Rule 23 deters 
violations of antitrust, 
securities, consumer 
protection, and civil 
rights laws.” 
15 9 91 51 60 9 35 26 
“Rule 23 encourages 
defendants to settle 
rather than defend on 
the merits because of 
the size of their 
potential liability.” 
22 2 115 36 33 32 57 5 
“Rule 23 wastes 
judicial resources 
through cumbersome, 
expensive, time 
consuming 
procedures.” 
8 7 88 57 11 57 46 15 
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TABLE II: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RULE 23 
Source: Responses to Rule 23 Questionnaire, May 12, 1977, in Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference, microfiched at CI-6509-32. 
Plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers split along predictable lines. The 
judges’ responses corroborated the widespread perception that Rule 23 had 
worn out its welcome with the courts by the late 1970s.
174
 But strong 
judicial support of certain measures, such as the ACTL’s proposed opt-in 
amendment, made some committee members wonder if judges really 
understood Rule 23 and its history.
175
 
The Advisory Committee managed to act on a couple of suggestions. In 
late 1977 it went so far as to approve a “just ain’t worth it” amendment, 
albeit one that would have permitted courts to weigh the case’s regulatory 
contribution along with the value of individual compensation it could 
 
 
 174. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Judicial 
Machinery of the Comm .on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 11 (1979) (statement of Daniel Meador) 
(reporting plaintiffs’ lawyers’ complaints that judges “are just hostile” to class actions); Gardner v. 
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 559 F.2d 209, 222 (10th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 478 (1978) 
(complaining of Eighth Circuit’s hostility to class actions); In re Franklin Nat. Bank Sec. Litig., 574 
F.2d 662, 673 (2d Cir. 1978), on reh’g, 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1978) (complaining that the burden 
class actions impose is “beyond all reason”).  
 175. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES OF THE MAY MEETING 5 (1977), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6505-64 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.) (summarizing statement of Judge Tuttle) (wondering whether “some of the judges who 
responded to the questionnaire were unaware of this history of the opt-in provision as against the opt-
out provision”). 
Proposal U.S. Circuit 
Judges 
 
U.S. District 
Judges 
 
Plaintiffs’ 
Attorneys 
Defense 
Attorneys 
 Favor Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Oppose 
“Replace the Opt-Out Provision of 
Rule 23(c)(2) with an Opt-In 
Provision.” 
16 8 98 50 6 62 52 10 
“Remove the Individual Notice 
Requirement from Rule 23(c)(2).” 
5 20 32 116 31 37 4 58 
“Amend Rule 23(b)(3) to require 
the plaintiffs to show a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits 
before class certification.” 
19 5 111 34 13 56 47 16 
“Specify that the relationship 
between predicted costs of 
litigation, to parties and the court, 
and aggregate potential recovery to 
the class is a factor in determining 
manageability of a class under 
Rule 23(b)(3)(D).” 
19 6 115 31 15 51 48 12 
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achieve against the costs of aggregate processing.
176
 As a “sad” Arthur 
Miller lamented, however, by this point the rulemaking process had “run 
into something approximating a brick wall.”177 The challenge of class 
action reform exceeded the committee’s institutional capacities, 
harmstrung as it was by the Enabling Act’s substantive rights proviso.178 
Walter Mansfield, a committee member, summarized the problem as he 
saw it: 
The Advisory Committee has wrestled with rule 23 and possible 
amendment to it at great length in an effort to simplify and improve 
the processing of class damage actions, but it has found that the 
problem is not simply one of procedure. The problem is also one of 
substance. As I personally see it, the question is: Should mass 
economic wrongdoers be forced to disgorge their illegal or ill-gotten 
gains in order to deter them from preying on others who are not in a 
position to protect themselves? That, to me, is a question of 
substance and not of procedure.
179
 
The Advisory Committee could not resolve the normative divide between 
the adjectival and regulatory conceptions of Rule 23. Accepting its 
limitations, it surrendered its supervisory responsibilities for Rule 23 to the 
Carter Administration and left class actions totally alone until 1990.
180
 
 
 
 176. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES OF THE DECEMBER 12–13, 1977 
MEETING, at 17–18, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ 
CV12-1977-min.pdf. The proposal envisioned “possible interests” to include “any substantial 
advantages that may result, as, for example, the deterrence of wrongful conduct by defendants in the 
future.” Id.; ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AGENDA (1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6506–10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 177. Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Citizens and 
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978). 
 178. Effective Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct Causing Mass Economic Injury, 
Proposal by U.S. Dept. of Justice to Amend Rule 23, at 10 (Dec. 2, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7802-07 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 179. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures, supra note 174, at 28 (statement of Walter 
Mansfield); see also Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of 
Columbia Circuit, 81 F.R.D. 263, 284 (1978) (comments of Bernard Ward, Reporter, Federal Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee) (explaining that the Advisory Committee supported Congressional action 
on Rule 23 because Rule 23 posed problems that were too substantive for it to resolve).  
 180. Notes of Rozel Thomsen for Presentation Before Judicial Conference, at 3 (Mar. 9, 1978), in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6512-93 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.) (recording the committee’s decision to endorse a legislative effort to overhaul Rule 23); see also 
MINUTES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES MEETING (1990), in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 161, 
162, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol1.pdf 
(describing decision to consider Rule 23 for reform). 
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2. The Carter Administration’s Rule 23 Replacement 
Nearly every year during the 1970s, Congress debated legislation that 
involved Rule 23 in one way or another. Usually the bills addressed a 
particular substantive area, with Congress considering how class litigation 
factored into a regulatory scheme’s overall implementation.181 In the late 
1970s, however, the Carter Administration lost patience with the pace of 
reform in the Advisory Committee and decided to take on wholesale class 
action reform itself.
182
 Class action reform got the attention of Griffin Bell, 
Jimmy Carter’s first attorney general.183 He tapped Virginia law professor 
Daniel Meador for the job,
184
 and by the end of Carter’s first year, Meador 
had drafted legislation to replace Rule 23(b)(3).
185
 Its length—a bloated 
twenty-four pages—reflected the class action’s new significance.  
The administration tried to straddle the normative divide that had 
stymied the Advisory Committee and polarized class action politics. A 
memorandum introduced the bill’s premise: “there are basically two kinds 
of [class actions,] and . . . to a large degree the problems encountered have 
resulted from the failure of current procedures to differentiate between 
them.”186 The bill solved this problem by dividing damages class actions 
into two categories. The first, initially described as a “public penalty 
procedure,” made more explicit the class action’s regulatory role by 
transforming the device into a qui tam mechanism. Whenever forty or 
more people suffered $500 or less in harm, a right of action would vest in 
 
 
 181. E.g., Consumer Protection Act: Report of the Senate Comm. on Commerce on S. 3201, 91st 
Cong. 16 (1970); Environmental Citizen Action: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong. 3 (1971); 
Inaccurate and Unfair Billing Practices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong. at 5 (1973); Antitrust Parens Patriae 
Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 27 (1974); The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 228 (1975). 
 182. Effective Procedural Remedies, supra note 178, at 10 (explaining why Congress should take 
over the job from the Advisory Committee and suggesting that the rulemaking process proceeds too 
slowly). 
 183. Anthony Lewis, Faith, Hope, and Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1977, at 23; see also Victor 
S. Navasky, The Greening of Griffin Bell, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 27, 1977, at 194. 
 184. The Chilling Impact of Litigation: Easier Access to the Courts Means Skyrocketing Costs and 
Interminable Delays, BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 58, 59. 
 185. Effective Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct Causing Mass Economic Injury, Draft 
Statute with Comment (Dec. 1, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed 
on CIS No. CI-7802-07 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 186. Effective Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct Causing Mass Economic Injury, 
Summary of Draft Proposal 1 (Dec. 1, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
microformed on CIS No. CI-7802-07 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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the United States.
187
 Five hundred dollars represented the threshold below 
which the administration estimated an ordinary person would not seek 
compensation; insofar as these suits were thought to have value, it was for 
their deterrent function.
188
 The process essentially replicated agency 
enforcement actions, with the right to sue belonging to the government. 
Individualized causation and damage assessments, problems for class 
certification, would disappear.
189
 The administration would give victims 
restitution after the imposition of an aggregate penalty on the defendant, 
with damages scheduling and other statistical techniques determining the 
amount.
190
  
The second type, the “class compensatory procedure,” cast the class 
action more as a joinder mechanism. It encompassed claims that had value 
even without aggregation, ones for which “private compensation, rather 
than deterrence, [is] the paramount concern.”191 The operative part of the 
proposal would overturn Snyder. Forty or more persons alleging claims 
under any law that exceeded $500 in per capita value could pursue a 
federal class action.
192
 The bill suggested several other tweaks to class 
action practice, including a lowered predominance threshold to enable 
certification and a preliminary merits determination before class 
certification, but otherwise left the class action status quo in place.
193
  
A collective yawn greeted the Advisory Committee’s proposed revision 
when published in 1964, but in 1978, with the class action wars fully 
underway, the Carter Administration’s bill drew a slew of comments.194 Its 
ambition reflected the overheated temperature of the class action wars. 
Something major had to give, and give in dramatic fashion. Starting over 
from scratch, as the Carter Administration proposed to do for Rule 
23(b)(3), seemed a reasonable response. But few constituencies 
demonstrated any enthusiasm for the bill,
195
 even as the administration 
 
 
 187. Draft Statute with Comment, supra note 185, at 32. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for 
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 340 (1980); Draft 
Statute with Comment, supra note 185, at 42–43. 
 190. Draft Statute with Comment, supra note 185, at 44. 
 191. Id. at 45. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 47. 
 194. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures, supra note 149, at 305 (statement of Daniel 
Meador). 
 195. E.g., id. at 419 (statement of Paul M. Bernstein); id. at 438 (statement of Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America); Judicial Access/Court Costs, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on 
Small Business, 96th Cong. 272 (1980) (statement of Defense Research Institute); id. at 276 (statement 
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pushed repeatedly for its enactment.
196
 Ultimately the effort failed. Never 
again has Congress seriously considered a wholesale legislative takeover 
of class actions, and reform efforts with an ambition even approximating 
the Carter Administration’s did not begin again until the 1990s. 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF STABILITY IN CLASS ACTION LAW, 1967–1980 
If reality had matched the heated rhetoric of the 1970s, then the fallow 
period for class action reform that began with the demise of the Carter 
Administration’s bill in 1980 is puzzling. But the situation on the ground 
was different. Arthur Miller got it right when he observed in 1979 that 
“class action practice under the existing rule appears to be stabilizing.”197 
Core doctrinal questions remained unanswered, sometimes shockingly 
so.
198
 Even more fundamental was the fight over Rule 23’s proper 
understanding, which continued unabated.
199
 Nonetheless, the federal 
judiciary and Congress successfully deployed a pragmatic balancing 
strategy for class action governance in each of the major substantive areas 
of class litigation, and kept the two conceptions in equipoise. These 
decision-makers managed to craft a body of doctrine that served the 
otherwise-inconsistent values confronting each other across the 
regulatory/adjectival divide. 
A. An Elaboration on the Dilemma of Class Action Governance 
As discussed in Part I, the regulatory and adjectival conceptions have 
normative implications for Rule 23’s deployment. In sum, the former 
permits courts to adjust substantive law and ordinary processes in the 
 
 
of the American Bar Association); id. at 288 (statement of National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association). 
 196. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1008, Pt. 1 (1980). 
 197. Miller, supra note 96, at 668. 
 198. The lower federal courts, for example, never settled on a consistent approach to the adequacy 
of representation requirement, sometimes permitting and sometimes refusing class treatment in the 
face of substantial and explicit class member dissatisfaction. E.g., Developments in the Law—Class 
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1489 n.190 (1976). Also, as one court rightfully complained in 1979, 
“[c]ommentators have done little to explicate or clarify the meaning of predominance,” the chief 
hurdle for certification in money damages cases. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D. Mass. 
1979). 
 199. Hutchinson, supra note 15, at 480 (describing these conflicting conceptions and noting that 
the Supreme Court has referred to both without choosing between them); C. Douglas Floyd, Civil 
Rights Class Actions in the 1980’s: The Burger Court’s Pragmatic Approach to Problems of Adequate 
Representation and Justiciability, 1984 BYU L. REV. 1, 59 (describing how the Supreme Court 
accommodated these two conceptions in civil rights class action cases of the late 1970s and early 
1980s). 
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name of regulatory efficacy, while the latter requires that class actions 
remain yoked, as much as possible, to the substantive and procedural 
norms that would govern individual litigation. The former focuses the 
court on the defendant’s conduct toward the aggregate, while the latter 
insists upon respect for the class member qua individual litigant. 
At the heart of the competition between the conceptions and their 
implications lies a fight over clashing values. The regulatory conception’s 
chief value of regulatory efficacy is straightforward. Courts should deploy 
Rule 23 to maximize the substantive law’s purchase, so as to compensate 
for inadequacies of public administration. Part I addresses the desired link 
between regulatory choices and a mechanism for democratic 
accountability as a justification for the adjectival conception. But, while 
this emphasis helps situate the history of class action governance within 
the management of the federal regulatory apparatus more generally, 
democratic legitimacy is properly subsumed within a broader term that 
more completely describes the full range of motivations for the adjectival 
conception. This understanding of Rule 23 privileges the traditional 
institutional role for the federal courts, or what might be called a value of 
judicial institutional integrity. A judge serves this value when she 
domesticates a class action to the individual lawsuit norm. 
If the regulatory and adjectival conceptions of Rule 23 further values of 
regulatory efficacy and institutional integrity, respectively, then the 
dilemma of class action governance comes more completely into focus. A 
rigid insistence that class action doctrine respect the federal court’s 
traditional institutional role would frustrate the regulatory efficacy value. 
Almost any class action involves individualized elements of claims, for 
example. A judge reluctant to adjust them would certify few classes, as the 
burden of the individualized processing necessary for these elements 
would outweigh any efficiency gain from the aggregate resolution of 
common issues of law or fact. Rendered nugatory, Rule 23 could not help 
private litigation contribute to federal regulatory objectives. 
Excessive enthusiasm for Rule 23’s regulatory potential, in contrast, 
can challenge the institutional integrity of the federal courts in a number of 
ways. Two of them have to do with deficits of institutional capacity.
200
 
Unlike agencies, with top-down, centralized decision-making processes, 
federal courts cannot calibrate the coercive effect of a particular 
 
 
 200. For a related but different, and expanded, treatment of these sorts of issues, see Richard A. 
Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 311–28 (1996). 
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substantive regime terribly well.
201
 The decision to settle a particular case 
and on what terms lies chiefly in the parties’ hands, so a judge has little 
say over what regulatory outcomes the case achieves.
202
 The judicial 
power to calibrate the overall regulatory force of a substantive regime is 
even weaker.
203
 Decisions to bring actions are decentralized and private, 
since plaintiffs’ lawyers make them, and the court’s regulatory authority is 
limited to what the parties bring before it.
204
 The diffusion of cases 
implicating the same set of substantive policies throughout the federal and 
state judiciaries limits an individual judge’s ability to manage the regime’s 
effect in the aggregate. Even if courts could overcome these limitations, 
the democratic legitimacy question, or under what circumstances should 
unelected judges spurred by private lawyers have the capacity to 
superintend litigation with significant regulatory consequences, would 
remain.
205
  
Also, federal judges have a limited capacity for substantive law reform. 
Provided they stay within the boundaries of their delegated power, 
agencies can mold the substantive law, even through adjudication.
206
 A 
host of constraints narrow a federal court’s authority to do the same. These 
include the Erie Doctrine, when cases involve state law; the Enabling Act, 
as a statutory limit on the scope of delegated powers; and more 
generalized anxieties about the separation of powers and democratic 
accountability. 
Regulatory zeal can also create challenges to institutional integrity that 
concern the processes and goals of civil litigation. Large-scale claims 
processing makes trial—the endgame for the ordinary civil process—
unrealistic, and instead emphasizes settlement, a largely privatized 
mechanism for resolution that minimizes the judge’s role. The class 
treatment of claims requires courts to abstract away from the particular 
circumstances of individual litigants, in conflict with the ideal of 
 
 
 201. Cf. Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 571–78 (1981) 
(commenting on this problem while discussing the broader issue of the privatization of securities 
enforcement). 
 202. The judge’s power is limited to reviewing the settlement for its fairness and adequacy. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(e). One reason why this is so is that, if a case settles, it is less likely to produce some 
authoritative legal norm that can apply to all participants in the regulated field instead of just the 
parties to the settlement itself. ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 51 (2009). 
 203. Cf. Rose, supra note 47, at 1326–30 (2008) (discussing this issue in the context of securities 
class action litigation). 
 204. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 34–38 (1977). 
 205. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding 
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 119–20 (2005). 
 206. See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194 (1947). 
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adjudication as an individualized process.
207
 Also, the often marginal per 
capita recoveries in many class actions, particularly as compared to fees 
counsel earned, question a traditional understanding of the court’s 
institutional identity, to render remedies due under the substantive law to 
deserving individuals. 
Arguably, the purported dichotomy between regulatory efficacy and 
judicial institutional integrity, as the primary values motivating the 
regulatory and adjectival conceptions, strikes a false note. If the realization 
of the substantive law’s full potential is a central judicial responsibility,208 
then an emphasis on regulatory efficacy strengthens the institutional 
integrity of the federal courts. Likewise, the conceit that the institutional 
identity of the federal courts necessarily includes an individualized, trial-
based process stressing claimant-specific compensation merits strenuous 
objection.
209
  
But the point here is not to take sides in a longstanding debate about 
the goals and character of federal litigation. Rather, it is to tell a story. 
With particular urgency in the 1970s, but really throughout Rule 23’s 
history,
210
 lawyers and judges did in fact think of the challenges class 
action governance posed in the terms described here. The dilemma of class 
action governance—how to balance regulatory efficacy and institutional 
integrity—was felt as real, however constructed or artificial the 
regulatory/adjectival divide.  
 
 
 207. Over the course of the 1970s adjudication within agencies evolved away from an 
individualized and discretionary system into a bureaucratic, rote, and rule-dominated one. See 
generally William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 98 YALE L.J. 
1198 (1983); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 7–8 (1977). 
 208. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1979). 
 209. Chayes, supra note 153, at 1283. Cf. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“Far from being the scourge of modern jurisprudence, class actions contribute to its salubrity and 
vitality.”). 
 210. E.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1973) (arguing 
that the challenge for courts handling Rule 23 boils down to “the determination of the extent to which 
proceedings within the judiciary will be permitted to resemble in function the administrative process”); 
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF 
COURTS 83–86 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 4–21 (1977); Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1987) (“An 
influential current in contemporary legal thought believes that the old-fashioned bipolar model of 
adjudication is hopelessly outmoded and that the federal courts should embrace with enthusiasm a 
newer model of adjudication, in which federal district courts carry out ambitious restructurings of 
public institutions, such as state and local welfare systems, in the manner of a regulatory agency. . . . 
Whatever the abstract merits of this approach . . . we do not find it embodied in Rule 23(b)(2) . . . .”); 
Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(commenting on how class actions contemplate a “fundamental departure from the traditional pattern 
in Anglo-American litigation . . . .”). 
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B. Value Balancing in 1970s Class Action Doctrine 
Joseph Sneed of the Ninth Circuit argued in 1973 that the judicial job 
in the 1970s was to “structure[]” class actions “so as to conform in the 
essential respects to the judicial process.”211 Decision-makers’ 
management of the class action reflected just this pragmatic objective. 
Throughout the 1970s, in all of Rule 23’s substantive areas, they 
sometimes applied Rule 23 in a manner consistent with the regulatory 
conception. They downplayed individualized aspects of cases that 
otherwise might have thwarted class certification and focused instead on 
their aggregate contributions.
212
 At other times, decision-makers rejected 
this flexibility, and, in keeping with the procedural conception, refused to 
lose sight of the individual within the aggregate.
213
 At times doctrinally 
unprincipled and often undertheorized, this evolutionary current 
nonetheless had a deep logic to it. Courts and other decision-makers 
applied, or acquiesced in the application, of Rule 23 to serve values of 
regulatory efficacy, up to the point that doing so unduly threatened the 
judiciary’s institutional integrity. 
1. Consumer Protection 
Rule 23’s experience in the consumer protection context generally, as 
well as a specific episode of doctrinal development, illustrate this 
balancing strategy at work. Since so many consumer claims have little 
monetary value, Rule 23, at least at first, had the potential to revolutionize 
the prospect for their enforcement. Amped-up private enforcement was 
important in the early 1970s because “federal, state, and local agencies 
nominally protecting consumers [were] woefully understaffed and 
underfinanced, morassed in a sea of red tape, and unbearably slow 
acting.”214 “Nothing stands out as more eloquent testimony to the failure 
of outmoded attempts to aid the consumer than the Federal Trade 
 
 
 211. La Mar, 489 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added). 
 212. E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975) (permitting certified class action to proceed 
even though named plaintiff’s claim became moot). 
 213. E.g., East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 (1977) 
(refusing to ignore particular circumstances of class members). 
 214. Arthur H. Travers, Jr. & Jonathan M. Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 811, 812 (1970). On the inadequacies of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, see Robert 
S. Adler, From “Model Agency” to Basket Case—Can the Consumer Product Safety Commission be 
Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 70 (1989). On the limitations of the Federal Trade Commission, 
see generally EDWARD F. COX ET AL., “THE NADER REPORT” ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
(1969). 
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Commission,” Senator Tydings wrote as he advocated for a muscular 
consumer class action, “a seemingly inert and lifeless bureaucracy long 
since exhausted of strength or initiative.”215 “In this supposedly 
‘consumers’ society,’” a New York Times editorialist wrote in 1969, the 
federal class action meant that “the consumer may at last be coming into 
his own.”216 “We see consumer class actions not just as a procedure to 
make the judicial system work,” an advocate later testified, “but much 
more as a substantive right of consumers.”217 
These great expectations foundered, at least in part, on judicially-
created shoals.
218
 In 1969, the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris held that 
a class could not aggregate its alleged damages to meet the amount in 
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.
219
 In his majority 
opinion, Hugo Black, who did not like the new class action,
220
 insisted that 
Rule 23 be treated as any other joinder rule would.
221
 Each individual class 
member’s status had to be considered for jurisdiction purposes as they 
would under any other joinder scenario, even if this unyielding perspective 
frustrated enforcement efforts.
222
 Zahn v. International Paper, decided 
four years later, rejected pendent jurisdiction for class member claims and 
thus shut off an avenue around Snyder.
223
 
Snyder and Zahn put all but the most valuable of state law claims 
beyond Rule 23’s reach. Because a great deal of the action on the 
consumer protection front in the 1960s and 1970s took place at the state 
 
 
 215. Tydings, supra note 133, at 478. 
 216. Your Money Back, supra note 126, at 40. See generally Mark L. Rosenberg, Comment, Class 
Actions for Consumer Protection, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (1972). 
 217. Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and 
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 15 (1978) (statement of 
Andrew A. Feinstein, Public Citizen Congress Watch). 
 218. Mayo L. Coiner, Class Actions: Aggregation of Claims for Federal Jurisdiction, 4 MEMPH. 
ST. U. L. REV. 427, 447 (1974) (describing Snyder as a “disappointment” and Zahn as a “tragedy”); 
Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978, supra note 212, at 14 (statement of Andrew Feinstein, 
Public Citizen); Peter H. Schuck & Marsha N. Cohen, The Consumer Class Action: An Endangered 
Species, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 47 (1974). 
 219. 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969). 
 220. He dissented from the Supreme Court’s approval of it in 1966. Order Dated Feb. 28, 1966, 
383 U.S. 1031, 1032–37 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). In a letter to John Frank written six weeks after 
the Court released Snyder, Justice Black wrote that “the rule is a very poor one.” Letter from Hugo 
Black to John Frank (May 2, 1969), in 2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE RULE 23 WORKING PAPERS, supra 
note 48, at 283. 
 221. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340; see also Milton Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 
72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39 (1972) (reading Snyder thusly). 
 222. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338. 
 223. 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973). 
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level,
224
 the decisions “rendered consumer class actions virtually 
nonexistent in federal courts,” as Ralph Nader complained.225 This denial 
of a federal forum mattered to consumer advocates. At the time of Snyder, 
state class action law was so rudimentary that state courts were rarely a 
viable alternative for consumer protection litigation.
226
 As the decade 
progressed, a number of states adopted versions of the new Rule 23,
227
 and 
a couple of them favored plaintiffs even more than the federal rule did.
228
 
But the state court option left consumer advocates underwhelmed.
229
 
Importantly, virtually no state court was willing to exercise jurisdiction 
over nonresident class members, except when the conduct at issue was 
localized within the state.
230
 In other words, consumer advocates generally 
could not bring multi-state class suits with significant regulatory 
consequences in state courts. 
However prejudicial to the cause of consumers, different rulings in 
Snyder and Zahn could have created problems of institutional capacity for 
the federal courts. A stampede of consumer protection lawsuits into the 
federal courts, invited by lax diversity jurisdiction requirements and the 
rudimentary condition of state class action regimes,
231
 would have turned 
federal judges into the country’s primary arbiters of state law-driven 
 
 
 224. E.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by 
Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 14–20 
(2006). 
 225. State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 16 (1977) 
(statement of Ralph Nader); see also Christopher P. Bisgaard, Comment, Expanding the Impact of 
State Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 UCLA L. 
REV. 1002, 1007–08 (1971). 
 226. Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
718, 718 & n.3 (1979). For an exception, see Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967). 
 227. Note, supra note 226, at 718 nn.7–8. 
 228. Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1324 n.22 (1976). 
 229. E.g., State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice, supra note 225, at 41 (statement of Thomas 
Ehrlich, President, Legal Services Corporation) (complaining that “class action relief is virtually 
impossible or is severely restricted” in “many” state court systems); Andrea R. Martin, Note, 
Consumer Class Actions With a Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 
1423 (1975) (reporting that, with two exceptions, no state court has “render[ed] a binding judgment in 
a consumer class action when there are members of the class residing outside its jurisdictional 
boundaries”); James Andrew Hinds, Jr., To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action, 13 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 776, 784 (1976) (“[M]any [state] courts have been loath to allow consumer class 
actions.”). 
 230. Allen R. Kamp, The Multistate Consumer Class Action: Local Solution, National Problems, 
87 W. VA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1984); Note, supra note 226, at 719. 
 231. On the status of state class action regimes in the early years of Rule 23, see Class Action and 
Other Consumer Protection Procedures, supra note 143, at 36 (statement of Sen. Tydings). 
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consumer protection policy.
232
 At the same time, the decisions hardly 
denied Rule 23 a regulatory role should Congress, the better body to set 
and calibrate regulatory objectives, federalize consumer protection policy. 
This is just what it was in the process of doing at the time of Snyder and 
Zahn.
233
 A number of the new consumer protection laws contained private 
rights of action,
234
 and some addressed the class treatment of claims 
explicitly.
235
 
A particular episode, the ebbs and flows of Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) litigation in the early part of the decade, highlights both the 
institutional challenges Rule 23 posed to federal judges and the pragmatic 
balancing strategy decision-makers deployed in response. As enacted in 
1968, TILA allowed debtor-plaintiffs to recover a penalty of up to $1,000 
with no showing of actual damages if the lender-defendant did not make 
certain required disclosures.
236
 Because plaintiffs did not have to establish 
either that the defendant injured them or that they suffered a particular 
quantum of harm, TILA claims made excellent candidates for class 
treatment.
237
 Class actions proliferated. 
This easy aggregation created a problem. Hundreds or thousands of 
debtors multiplied by the $1,000 per debtor penalty created cases with 
millions on the line, even in instances when no one suffered any 
perceptible injury. An institutional dilemma involving judicial capacities 
for enforcement calibration and law reform followed. If judges certified 
these classes, lenders could face huge liabilities for technical errors. As 
Judge Marvin Frankel of the Southern District of New York wrote in his 
influential Ratner v. Chemical Bank decision of 1972,
238
 a class judgment 
could mean “a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to 
 
 
 232. For a defense of Snyder that fits with these claims, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the 
Class Action Rule: An Inventory of Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class Action, 71 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 186, 192–93 (1996). 
 233. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the 
Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 34 n.2 (1982). 
 234. E.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2012). 
 235. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012); Magnuson-Moss Warranty—
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (2012); Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 236. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (2012); see also Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474 F.2d 
336, 339 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973) (reprinting relevant part of TILA as enacted in 1968). 
 237. Cf. Wilcox, 474 F.2d at 343 (“[T]here is nothing in the Act itself, the Rule, or the notes of the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to it which expressly or impliedly 
precludes class actions in this type of case.”). 
 238. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Comment, 
The Truth in Lending Class Action, 40 ALB. L. REV. 753, 765 (1976); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 
496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing cases). 
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any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant . . . .”239 
But other judges worried that, if they denied class certification out of 
concern for over-regulation, they could usurp legislative and rulemaker 
prerogative, since TILA claims fit Rule 23 so neatly.
240
 The situation also 
posed institutional identity difficulties. Brought by “near-nominal 
plaintiffs,” as Judge Sneed scoffed, these penalty-only lawsuits had no 
compensatory objective and instead treated courts as “part-time regulatory 
agenc[ies].”241 Moreover, the in terrorem effect of class certification made 
trial inconceivable for any defendant with the slightest sensitivity to 
risk.
242
 Out went ordinary expectations about possible endgames for 
litigation. 
The lower federal courts overwhelmingly refused to certify TILA 
classes and thereby weakened the statute’s regulatory value.243 Congress, 
in contrast, pursued a more balanced solution. In 1974, it capped the 
aggregate penalty obtainable in a class action at the lesser of $100,000 or 
1% of the defendant’s net worth,244 manifestly to disavow decisions 
rejecting class certification but also to moderate TILA’s regulatory bite.245 
When the cap proved too low, Congress increased it to $500,000 in 
1976,
246
 a change that seemed to strike a pretty good balance.
247
 As with 
consumer protection law more generally, an institution with unquestioned 
 
 
 239. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416; see also Garza v. Chi. Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.RD. 548, 549 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972) (denying class certification on grounds that “the minimum recovery would be devastating for 
a small company”); Mathews v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 479, 479–80 (N.D. Cal. 
1974); Linn v. Target Stores, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D. Minn. 1973) (denying class certification 
motion and referring to the “potentially devastating effect on defendants”). 
 240. Beard v. King Appliance Co., 61 F.R.D. 434, 440 (E.D. Va. 1973). This concern came up in 
other contexts. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1114 (5th Cir. 1978) (insisting in another 
consumer protection context that the effect of a penalty on a defendant should be considered in the 
class certification determination only “in extreme cases”); Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 
No. 76 of Wis., 470 F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir. 1973) (Eschbach, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should 
not refuse to certify because of the effect of a judgment and instead seek a remedy in the rulemaking 
process). 
 241. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Haynes v. 
Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974) (observing that the point of TILA is 
regulatory). 
 242. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 761–62 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 243. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLASS ACTIONS BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURTS UNDER SECTION 
130 OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (1976) (compiling list of cases). 
 244. Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title IV, 408(a), 88 Stat. 1500 (1974); see also Joseph A. Dworetzky, 
Comment, Truth in Lending and the Federal Class Action, 22 VILL. L. REV. 418, 425 (1977). 
 245. S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 14–15 (1973). 
 246. S. REP. NO. 94-590, at 8 (1976); see also James K. LeValley & Richard K. Walker, Truth-in-
Lending Class Actions Under Amended Section 130, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 478–82 (1976); Boggs v. 
Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 247. Margaret E. Murphy, Comment, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 26 LOY. L. 
REV. 333, 341 (1980). 
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legitimacy to alter the substantive regime explicitly preserved some 
regulatory force for a TILA penalty class suit while relieving judges of the 
calibration difficulty and lessening the identity problem.  
2. Securities 
Although the Advisory Committee identified federal securities claims 
as proper Rule 23 fodder, they needed an adjustment before courts could 
aggregate them for class treatment. Some causes of action require proof 
that the investor relied on the misrepresentation,
248
 and plaintiffs have to 
prove their damages. Because relevant evidence can differ from investor to 
investor, these elements create predominance and superiority problems for 
class certification. If necessary, individualized determinations of reliance 
would make classwide proceedings exceptionally unwieldy and 
inefficient.
249
 Scrupulous concern that each class member prove his or her 
reliance would respect the preexisting substantive law and thus resonate 
with the adjectival conception. “Carried to its logical end,” however, as the 
Second Circuit observed in 1968, such evidentiary rigidity “would negate 
any attempted class action under” the securities laws.250 Private litigation’s 
contribution to securities enforcement would disappear. 
Openly concerned with regulatory efficacy,
251
 federal courts used 
several techniques to deal with the reliance problem.
252
 Courts bifurcated 
the proceedings, declaring that reliance issues could be adjudicated in 
follow-on, individualized processes,
253
 or, as Jack Weinstein described 
them with wonderful ambiguity in an influential opinion, “equitable 
procedures, appropriate to the circumstances of [the] case . . . .”254 Applied 
with “the importance of 10b-5 class actions as a weapon against securities 
fraud” in mind,255 this strategy dodged the problem rather than solve it.256 
 
 
 248. For a brief discussion of the status of this issue under securities law of the time, see 
Lawrence D. Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 84 n.43 
(1969). 
 249. In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 97 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
 250. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Richard O. Cunningham, 
Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1150, 1156 (1968). 
 251. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 252. See generally Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1212–13 (2d Cir. 1972) (describing 
these techniques). 
 253. E.g., Green, 406 F.2d at 301; Herbst v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 13, 19 (D. Conn. 
1973); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 254. Dolgow, 43 F.R.D. at 491. 
 255. Green, 406 F.2d at 299. 
 256. See In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 98 (making this point). 
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In theory, if defendants had insisted that each individual class member 
prove his or her reliance, the parties would have a great deal more to 
litigate, even after the resolution of common issues like materiality or 
misrepresentation. Predominance findings required for class certification 
could be difficult to justify. For reasonable litigants, however, these 
individualized processes would never materialize. Judge Frankel made 
explicit what his colleagues must have assumed, that “civilized litigants 
and attorneys find ways to settle individual claims where the questions of 
general application go against defendants.”257 
The second technique involved the substantive alteration of the reliance 
requirement, a more principled solution but one that posed institutional 
problems. Spencer Williams, who continued to wield Rule 23 creatively 
(or abusively, depending on one’s perspective) throughout his career,258 
derived an “objective standard” for the reliance element.259 Concerned for 
“the ultimate effectiveness of the security anti-fraud laws,”260 he did so 
expressly to “preserve[] the class action procedure in [the] large securities 
case.”261 More prominently, the Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack 
followed the trail blazed by pioneering district judges when it adopted the 
fraud-on-the-market doctrine, creating in effect an irrebuttable 
presumption of reliance upon proof of the misstatement’s materiality.262 
This move had a basis in economic theory.
263
 But the desire to certify a 
class clearly motivated the Blackie court and a number of the other fraud-
on-the-market enthusiasts.
264
 Some wondered whether the Enabling Act’s 
 
 
 257. Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 442 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For 
the same sentiment, registered in a different context but dealing with the same problem, see Neely v. 
United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Note, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 
10b-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 346 (1971); AMERICAN COLLEGE, supra note 162, at 9; John N. 
Hauser, The Class Action Struggle Continues: The Problems Eisen Ignored, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 81 
(1975); Hugh Latimer, Damages, Settlements and Attorneys’ Fees in Antitrust Class Actions, 49 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1553, 1553 (1980). 
 258. See generally In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
 259. In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 100 (reasoning that with an objective standard of 
reliance, “the court (and jury) is freed from the overwhelming task of examining the subjective intent 
of each class member”). 
 260. Id. at 98 (interior quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted). 
 261. Id. at 99. 
 262. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 263. For a slightly later discussion of the theoretical basis for fraud-on-the-market doctrine, see 
generally Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982). 
 264. In most if not all of the early decisions adopting the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, courts 
made this move as part of their class certification analyses. E.g., Blackie, 524 F.2d at 905–08; Tucker, 
67 F.R.D. at 477–81; Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 54 F.R.D. 420, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443, 499–501 (S.D. Cal. 1974); see also Note, supra note 263, at 
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delegation of rulemaking power permitted this reformation of the 
substantive law in the name of procedural facilitation.
265
 This objection 
drew glib responses from several judges, who maintained that they would 
simply extend this substantive alteration to all cases and not just class 
actions.
266
 
Both techniques for dealing with the reliance problem minimized the 
relevance of individual investor circumstances and focused the litigation 
entirely on the defendant’s undifferentiated conduct toward the 
aggregate,
267
 an orientation consistent with the regulatory conception. The 
disappearing individual litigant, however, created institutional integrity 
problems. The bifurcation strategy depended on the tacit acknowledgment 
that securities cases would settle upon the resolution of common issues. 
The bootstrap strategy required courts to craft substantive securities 
policy. Both deemed the individual plaintiff irrelevant, a perspective in 
conflict with a traditional conception of the court’s role. Also, judicial 
willingness to depart from substantive and procedural norms may have 
contributed to an uptick in securities filings in the early 1970s, and with it 
the prospect of regulatory overkill.
268
 
The Supreme Court’s 1974 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin decision has 
a certain logic in light of these institutional concerns. The Court held that, 
upon certification, the class representative must mail notice to all class 
members whose addresses are known, and that he or she must bear the 
cost of this notice.
269
 The Court affirmed an anti-class action jeremiad 
from the Second Circuit,
270
 and for this reason and others its decision 
 
 
1159 (observing that the desire to certify classes was “an unstated rationale for the fraud-on-the-
market decisions”). 
 265. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., 
dissenting); Adolf Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23 
BUFF. L. REV. 343, 371 (1974); Marvin Schwartz, The Class Action: Its Incidence and the Eisen 
Cases, 29 BUS. LAW. 155, 156 (1973); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized 
Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 866 
(1974); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of 
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 54 (1975). 
 266. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908; Tucker, 67 F.R.D. at 480. 
 267. Mordecai Rosenfeld, The Impact of Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Law, 1972 
DUKE L.J. 1167, 1179. 
 268. Barbara Ann Banoff & Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., The Class Action as a Mechanism for 
Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws: An Empirical Study of the Burdens Imposed, 31 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1, 45–46 (1984); 1991 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, 14 CLASS ACTION REP. 284, 285 
(1991). 
 269. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). 
 270. Id. at 179. see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1022 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, 
J., dissenting) (commenting on the hostility the majority opinion demonstrated toward the class 
action). 
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struck many as an intemperate attack on Rule 23.
271
 Hardly compelled by 
precedent, the notice requirement was unnecessary to ensure good 
representation for class members.
272
 Moreover, Eisen created a steep 
hurdle for the prosecution of some class actions. Because plaintiffs’ 
lawyers would blanch at fronting the costs of individualized notice, Time 
Magazine reported in 1974, “class actions on behalf of large numbers of 
plaintiffs who have each suffered similar small losses will have practically 
no chance of succeeding.”273 
Eisen has won few converts among proceduralists over the years.
274
 
But it is not altogether illogical if read as a decision about enforcement 
calibration for private securities litigation, an obvious concern for several 
justices in the mid-1970s.
275
 An expensive notice requirement can control 
the volume and type of securities litigation. Faced with the high cost of 
 
 
 271. E.g., The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust 
and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 353 (1975) (statement of Joseph L. Alioto); 
Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and 
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 14–15 (1978) 
(statement of Andrew Feinstein, Public Citizen). 
 272. For theoretical criticism of Eisen, see generally Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who 
Needs It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97. For doctrinal criticism, see, for example, Abram Chayes, Foreword, 
Public Law Litigation and the Supreme Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31–32 (1982). Whether it was 
consistent with committee member expectations is unclear. Compare Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing 
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 356, 396 (1967) (arguing for a different interpretation of Rule 23(c) than what the Court 
adopted in Eisen), with Letter from Patrick Higginbotham to Members of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules (May 8, 1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV1995-11.pdf (quoting John Frank as stating that “[t]he 1966 committee 
clearly and unanimously thought (b)(3) required notice”). 
 273. Taking Mass from Class, TIME MAG., June 10, 1974; see also Neil J. Cohen, Eisen III: Its 
Significance to Class Actions in General, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1973, at 1; Linda Charlton, Impact of 
Ruling by Court Studied, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1974, at 29; State of the Judiciary and Access to 
Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 710 (1977) (statement of the Society of American Law 
Teachers). On notice costs and class actions, see D. Rhett Brandon, Note, Notice Cost Problems Under 
Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) After Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 1979 DUKE L.J. 882, 883–86. 
 274. E.g., Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits 
on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 338 (2011); Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A 
Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2019 (2007); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27–33 (1991); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (describing 
the result in Eisen as “peculiar”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 739 (1975). 
 275. One year after Eisen, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the 
Court expressed a great deal less desire for private enforcement of the securities laws than it had in J.I. 
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), a decade earlier. See also E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, 
The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1571, 1581–82 (2004). 
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mailing letters to thousands of class members, only sufficiently-capitalized 
lawyers can bring cases. The pool of plaintiffs’ lawyers capable of 
handling aggregate litigation shrinks, limiting the overall number of class 
suits. Notice expenses also can operate as a crude screen for quality, since 
a strike suit with nuisance value becomes less attractive as the anticipated 
costs of litigation rise. Eisen also makes sense as a matter of institutional 
identity. Notice to all known class members makes them at least 
marginally relevant as litigants, while a lesser notice obligation signals the 
second-class status of individual remediation as a litigation goal. In this 
manner, Eisen lessened the gap between class actions and traditional 
litigation.
276
 
3. Antitrust 
Private antitrust litigation had particular appeal as a substitute for 
public administration in the late 1960s, when criticism of the federal 
agencies responsible for antitrust enforcement, particularly the Federal 
Trade Commission, reached a fever pitch.
277
 Had an argument defense-
side advocates urged early in Rule 23’s modern era gained traction, 
however, the antitrust class action would have proven stillborn. A Clayton 
Act claim requires that the plaintiff establish the defendant’s illegality, his 
injury, and his damages.
278
 While the first element concerns the 
defendant’s conduct and often does not vary from purchaser to purchaser, 
the latter two address the effects of the defendant’s behavior on particular 
plaintiffs. Milton Handler seized on these circumstances in a famous 
article attacking the antitrust class action. This “complex of particularized 
fact issues . . . [has] to be determined for each class member,” he argued, 
and the defendant has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial before 
any individual plaintiff could recover anything.
279
 One of two results 
would follow if a court nonetheless certified a class. A court would drown 
in “either a massive trial lasting for years or a multitude of mini-trials,” 
 
 
 276. For a recognition from the time of Eisen’s significance along these lines, see Berry 
Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 277. On the FTC, see Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 
(1969); Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777 
(1971). On the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, see MARK J. GREEN ET AL., THE CLOSED 
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1972); Trust-Busting: Now it’s a Game Everybody Can Play, FORBES, Oct. 1, 
1973, at 50. 
 278. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 279. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The 
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1971). 
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imposing an unacceptable burden on the court if the defendant insisted on 
litigating.
280
 
More realistically, Handler continued, the defendants will seek to settle 
once the plaintiffs establish that they acted unlawfully.
281
 Some pragmatic 
courts made just this assumption, that defendants would settle and thereby 
render concern for individualized issues academic, to justify the 
certification of antitrust classes.
282
 To someone committed to an adjectival 
conception of Rule 23, this result was a travesty. “Any device which is 
workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and 
expansive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure,” 
Handler fulminated, “it is a form of legalized blackmail.”283 
If accepted, Handler’s argument would have killed off the antitrust 
class action entirely. Defendants made variants of the argument from the 
modern era’s start, but courts refused to bite.284 At first, they soft-pedaled 
worries like his with suggestions of bifurcated trial plans
285
 and vague 
proposals that individual claims be “processed administratively.”286 
Concern for the regulatory efficacy of antitrust laws—a need to implement 
the “Sherman Act as an economic ‘charter of freedom,’” as Judge (and 
Advisory Committee member) Charles Wyzanski wrote—clearly 
motivated these decisions.
287
 
Over time, an arguably more principled pattern emerged, one that 
responded to Handler’s objections with a pragmatic emphasis on 
evidentiary reality over legal rigidity. Formally, a defendant in a case 
involving fungible goods or services distributed through undifferentiated 
channels could require all class members to establish their injury and 
damages in jury trials after a common showing of illegality. But no 
 
 
 280. Id. at 8. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 442 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 283. Handler, supra note 279, at 9. A number of judges found Handler’s critique compelling. E.g., 
Eisen v. Carlise & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting this argument); Ungar v. 
Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1222 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Handler). 
 284. E.g., Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 798 (10th Cir. 1970); Phila. Elec. 
Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
 285. Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016, 1021–22 (4th Cir. 1976) (approving the 
district court’s plan to bifurcate the liability issue from the injury and damages issues by invoking the 
district judge’s “common sense, skill, and discretion”). 
 286. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 287. Windham, 539 F.2d at 1021; Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 150 (E.D. 
Pa. 1975) (“The chief policy argument in favor of a hospitable attitude toward such class actions is that 
they tend to reinforce the regulatory scheme by providing an additional deterrent beyond that afforded 
either by public enforcement or by single-party private enforcement . . . . [T]he revised Rule 23 may 
be seen as an extension . . . of the deterrent policies of . . . § 4 of the Clayton Act.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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sensible defendant would waste resources doing so once evidence of 
injury and damages, essentially uniform for all plaintiffs, established a 
generic class member’s right to recover. Under these circumstances, a 
defendant could get a meaningful evidentiary evaluation of its liability, 
without individual trials, before settling. For cases of this ilk, courts 
allowed that injury and damages elements could be established 
mechanistically, without individual hearings, and permitted 
certification.
288
 Cases involving more idiosyncratic transactions, in 
contrast, could not proceed as class actions.
289
 “The general interest of 
society at large” could not justify generalized, generic proof of damages 
and injury—an abstraction from individual litigant circumstances and a 
substantive alteration of the Clayton Act’s requirements—when the 
defendant’s liability could not be meaningfully established without 
individualized proof.
290
 
Issues of judicial institutional integrity surfaced in another antitrust 
issue in the 1970s. In certain instances, the nature of the market and the 
size of claims involved make the distribution of damages to antitrust class 
members extremely difficult if not impossible. In the late 1960s, for 
example, taxicabs in Los Angeles fixed prices. Since customers rarely kept 
receipts, and since drivers did not record their identities, getting 
compensation to victims was essentially impossible.
291
 A court could 
justifiably deny class certification because of this problem.
292
 
Fluid recovery is one response. The court calculates the aggregate 
damages the defendant caused. It then orders the defendant to offer its 
service or product at a discounted price going forward, until it has returned 
the overcharge to purchasers. New customers will get an undeserved 
discount, and victims who never use the defendant’s product or service 
again will not recover anything. Repeat customers, however, will benefit 
from this discount and thereby recoup their damages, albeit indirectly.
293
 
 
 
 288. Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 324 (5th Cir. 1978); Windham v. Am. 
Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 at 68 (4th Cir. 1977); Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. DBAG, Civ. 
No. N-77-1443, 1979 WL 1718, at *10–14 (D. Md. July 2, 1979); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream 
Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 120 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
 289. In re Hotel Tele. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1974); Windham, 565 F.2d at 67; Blue 
Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d at 318. 
 290. In re Hotel Tele. Charges, 500 F.2d at 89. 
 291. E.g., Charlotte E. Hemker-Smith, Note, Consumer Class Actions in California: A Practical 
Approach to the Problem of Notice, 7 PAC. L.J. 811, 840–41 (1976) (describing Daar v. Yellow Cab). 
 292. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 
156 (1974). 
 293. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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Whatever its economic logic, the fluid recovery response to the 
manageability problem poses significant capacity and identity challenges. 
Fluid recovery not only jettisons the damages element entirely from 
antitrust claims, it also decouples the remedy from a particular class 
member’s entitlement to compensation. It amounts to substantive law 
reform and sidelines individualized compensation as a central litigation 
objective.
294
 Most lower federal courts followed the Second Circuit’s 
Eisen decision and rejected fluid recovery in the 1970s, chiefly on grounds 
that courts could not allow the need for class certification to distort the 
substantive law so nakedly.
295
 The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to 
reject fluid recovery so categorically in a decision issued at the very end of 
this period of Rule 23’s history.296 It made the remedy’s availability 
explicitly contingent upon regulatory need, as expressed in the substantive 
law. If the underlying law placed a premium on deterrence objectives, the 
Seventh Circuit held, then courts should be more inclined to permit this 
deviation from litigation norms.
297
 
Another response to the decisions against fluid recovery also fits the 
pragmatic balancing strategy. Judicial unwillingness to allow fluid 
recovery spurred Congress, indisputably the better institution to alter 
substantive rights, to act.
298
 The Senate version of what became the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 expressly authorized 
fluid recovery in private antitrust suits.
299
 The statute as enacted did not 
include this provision, but Congress did amend the Clayton Act to 
authorize state attorneys general to bring suits to seek aggregate damages 
and thereby shoulder some of the regulatory burden private litigants could 
not.
300
 
 
 
 294. Simon, supra note 147, at 386; Handler, supra note 221, at 36. 
 295. Windham, 565 F.2d at 72 & n.41; In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1635 (1976); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 407 (1982). 
 296. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 297. Id. at 676. 
 298. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 6 (1975) (observing that Eisen’s manageability holding 
requires a legislative response). 
 299. Milton Handler & Michael D. Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy 
of Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 632 (1976) (describing 
legislative history). 
 300. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2006). 
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4. Employment Discrimination 
The pervasive gender and racial discrimination in the American 
workplace of the late 1960s overwhelmed the capacity of federal agencies 
to respond.
301
 For a number of reasons, individual lawsuits were an 
inadequate substitute.
302
 Given these circumstances, regulatory efficacy, 
not the particulars of individual litigants, evidently mattered most to the 
federal courts that superintended Title VII litigation in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. They “mold[ed] class action practice” in Title VII cases, a 
Third Circuit judge observed in 1979, “so as best to effectuate the policies 
underlying the [substantive law]”.303 Antidiscrimination litigation was 
private in “‘form only,’” the Fifth Circuit declared in 1968, because class 
actions “‘vindicate[ed] a policy that Congress considered of the highest 
priority,’”304 and because private litigation had to compensate for 
 
 
 301. Black men earned 42% of their white counterparts in 1965. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The 
Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 4 (1987). In 
1968, women earned about 60% of what men earned. The black unemployment rate was twice that of 
whites in 1970. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 194–95 (Comm. Print 1972). That year blacks were 
10% of the labor force but held only 3% of white collar jobs. Id. at 1294, 1430. Median family income 
for blacks was 60% of whites’. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS 
OF NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 38, at 
64 (July 1971). By the early 1970s the EEOC had demonstrated little ability to use its non-coercive 
powers effectively. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, supra. The Department of 
Justice, which alone among agencies could bring coercive actions, filed only 76 cases from 1966 to 
1972. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT—1977, at 
273–74 (1977). 
 302. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 48 (1969) 
(describing why black employees in the South are reluctant to go forward individually to complain 
about discrimination); see also Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 559 F.2d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (commenting on the inadequacies of individual actions to remediate 
discrimination). 
 303. Scott v. Univ. of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 93 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring); see also La 
Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1973); see Note, Antidiscrimination 
Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 
YALE L.J. 868, 885–86 (1979) (arguing that courts used an “entity class” concept in Title VII cases); 
Donald W. Anderson, Title VII Class Actions: The End of the Era of the Irrelevant Plaintiff, 36 
MERCER L. REV. 907, 909 (1985); Scott, 601 F.2d at 93 (Adams, J., concurring); Donaldson v. 
Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 1977); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710, 713 
(5th Cir. 1973) (“The federal courts have a particularly vital role in cases such as this. To them alone 
Congress has assigned the power to enforce compliance with the strictures against racial 
discrimination in employment. . . .”); Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 
1974); see also Larry W. Bridgesmith, Representing the Title VII Class Action: A Question of Degree, 
26 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1429 (1980) (observing that “close attention to the elements of Rule 23 was 
deemed secondary to the formation of class-wide remedies”). 
 304. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968) (citation omitted); see 
also Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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inadequate public administration.
305
 “‘[C]laims under Title VII involve the 
vindication of a major public interest,’” the D.C. Circuit likewise insisted, 
“‘and . . . any action under the Act involves considerations beyond those 
raised by the individual claimant.’”306 This emphasis spurred several 
developments consistent with the regulatory conception of Rule 23. First, 
courts paid little heed to the actual wishes of class members. The public’s 
interest in the vindication of the civil rights laws could justify class 
certification over objections from class members who complained about 
inadequate representation.
307
 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, most lower federal courts 
shoehorned back pay claims into Rule 23(b)(2), a provision designed for 
class actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
308
 As an equitable 
remedy, back pay is formally distinguishable from claims for money 
damages, which trigger Rule 23(b)(3)’s application. But each plaintiff’s 
entitlement to back pay still turns on proof of causation and harm, 
individualized elements that raise the sort of case management concerns 
that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements 
address.
309
 Courts ignored this functional equivalence and justified Rule 
23(b)(2) treatment with strikingly suspect logic.
310
 Doing so facilitated the 
prosecution of Title VII class actions in two ways. Proposed classes did 
not have to surmount the predominance and superiority barriers to 
certification. Also, since Rule 23 requires notice only for (b)(3) class 
 
 
 305. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 306. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 151 n.177 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 307. Rodriguez, 505 F.2d at 50–51 (finding representation adequate even though members of the 
union on whose behalf the action was brought voted against the relief sought); Sperry Rand Corp. v. 
Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1977) (permitting a case to go forward as a class action even 
though union members voted 83-0 against the case); Int’l Woodworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, CLC v. 
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 568 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 590 F.2d 
140, 144 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 308. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron 
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 341 (10th 
Cir. 1975). 
 309. Paddison v. Fid. Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (“Style it what you will, back pay 
disputes raise all the traditional (b)(3) problems.”). The authors of the 1966 revision did not expect that 
any type of claim for monetary compensation could proceed pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). Transcript, 
supra note 85, at 62 (statement of Albert Sacks) (declaring that Rule 23(b)(2) “is not issued with any 
thought of . . . a judgment which in effect orders the payment of money”). 
 310. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 802; see also Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)); cf. 
George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11, 24 
(1983) (describing this justification for Rule 23(b)(2) treatment of back pay claims as “surprisingly 
weak”); Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1981) (expressing doubt as to the 
rationale to allow back pay claims in under Rule 23(b)(2)). 
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members, (b)(2) certification lowered the cost of litigation.
311
 To deal with 
the individual causation and harm elements of back pay claims, courts 
suggested damages scheduling or presumptions that were irrebutable in all 
but name.
312
 These techniques kept the litigation focused on the 
defendant’s aggregate conduct, not individual litigant circumstances. 
Third, federal courts certified “across-the-board” classes, at least for 
most of the 1970s. A class member alleging discrimination in hiring, for 
example, could represent alleged victims of the employer’s promotion 
decisions and thereby attack the entirety of its human resources 
practices.
313
 Courts necessarily had to abstract away from individual 
circumstances in order to certify these classes. Rule 23(a)(2), for example, 
requires that the class members’ claims share a common issue of law or 
fact. By one interpretation, commonality requires that all class members’ 
claims bear significant resemblance.
314
 For across-the-board classes, 
however, the mere allegation that “the ‘Damoclean threat of a racially 
discriminatory policy’” hung over everyone’s head sufficed, no matter 
how different the circumstances of an applicant refused a job versus an 
employee denied a promotion.
315
 
Fueled by these and other applications of Rule 23 that deemphasized 
individual litigant circumstances,
316
 the Title VII class action engine 
helped drive the social reconstruction of the American workplace in the 
1970s.
317
 In one important instance, however, a court imbued with 
regulatory zeal pushed too far. In Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight 
 
 
 311. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 1975). The avoidance of notice 
costs after Eisen was important, given that the NAACP prosecuted most Title VII cases. NANCY 
MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 86 (2006). 
 312. Pettway, 494 F.2d at 260–63; United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1055–56 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
 313. Donald W. Anderson, Title VII Class Actions: The End of the Era of the Irrelevant Plaintiff, 
36 MERCER L. REV. 907, 912 (1985); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57, 65 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Michael Fischl, Comment, The Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment 
on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175, 177 (1978). 
 314. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 463–64 (10th Cir. 1974). 
 315. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969); see also U.S. Fid. 
and Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 871 (8th Cir. 1978); Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: 
The Trend in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987). 
 316. For example, individual class members did not have to file charges with the EEOC provided 
that the class representative did. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). 
Also, courts did not require any real showing that the alleged class met the numerosity threshold for 
certification. Horn v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 317. On the effectiveness of Title VII litigation during the 1970s, see, for example, Paul Frymer, 
Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor 
Unions, 1935–85, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483, 490–95 (2003); Blumrosen, supra note 301, at 1–4; 
MacLean, supra note 86, at 76–113; PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 90–94 (2008). 
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Systems, Inc., Mexican-American truck drivers sued their employer, a 
Texas trucking company, alleging that they were not promoted because of 
their race.
318
 Although they styled their suit as a class action, the plaintiffs 
never filed a class certification motion, and they stipulated at trial that they 
were litigating only their own claims.
319
 The plaintiffs lost at trial when the 
court ruled that they were not eligible for promotions and thus suffered no 
Title VII injury.
320
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified an across-the-
board class sua sponte despite conflicting preferences among classes of 
employees and applicants, and despite the individual plaintiffs’ loss below. 
It then directed judgment in the class’s favor based on statistical evidence 
showing disparate patterns in hiring and promotion.
321
 
From a regulatory perspective, the Fifth Circuit’s decision was 
unremarkable. The statistics suggested a problem, and the court 
responded. The argument that the Fifth Circuit stayed within its proper 
institutional boundaries is harder to maintain. The case before the Fifth 
Circuit was headless, since no class member replaced the named class 
representatives with their meritless claims. The court’s decision 
manifested little concern for the individual identities of class members. 
The Fifth Circuit also assumed the litigants’ role by imposing class 
certification on them, and it entered judgment in the class’s favor even 
though the district court’s findings of fact favored the defendant. 
The Supreme Court in 1977 reversed with a decision pulling Title VII 
litigation toward the adjectival side of the divide.
322
 Class representatives, 
the Court held, must be members of the class they purport to represent.
323
 
Real litigants must be joined to the case, and they must “possess the same 
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”324 Some 
commitment to procedural regularity has to temper the desire to wield 
Rule 23 as a weapon against systemic discrimination in the workplace.
325
 
The “across-the-board” class action limped along for a few years after 
 
 
 318. Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, Inc., No. SA-71-CA-302, 1973 WL 200 (W.D. Tex. 
1974). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 52 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 322. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
 323. Id. at 403–04. 
 324. Id. at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 325. Id. at 405 (“[S]uits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class 
suits, involving classwide wrongs. . . . But careful attention to the requirements of [Rule 23] remains 
nonetheless indispensable.”). 
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Rodriguez, permitted in some circuits but not in others.
326
 It ended 
unequivocally in 1982 when the Supreme Court decided General 
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon.
327
 
C. The Stable Federal Class Action 
In a number of important ways, class action doctrine remained 
muddled by the end of the 1970s.
328
 The contest over the proper 
conception of Rule 23 persisted.
329
 Doctrinal confusion and the unbridged 
divide over what exactly Rule 23 was for would hardly seem the stuff of a 
stable area of law. Nonetheless, when the Carter Administration tried to do 
something about the federal class action, few lawyers of any stripe lent 
their support. Courts have “now achieved a measure of stability and 
consensus in dealing with class actions[,]” a corporate lobbyist 
maintained.
330
 A prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer agreed that Rule 23 “has, in 
the main, worked well.”331 By almost any measure, the use of Rule 23 in 
the federal courts had stabilized. Several reasons why this was so were 
historically-contingent, but others shed light on good governance 
strategies for a device pulled between two poles and the competing values 
each one stands for.  
 
 
 326. Compare Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1979) (reading Rodriguez to 
reject the across-the-board class action), with Falcon v. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 626 F.2d 369, 375 
(5th Cir. 1980) (reading Rodriguez to permit across-the-board class actions), vacated, 457 U.S. 147 
(1982). 
 327. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 328. Sometimes the commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2) posed a hurdle to class 
certification, while other times it was inconsequential. Compare Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
673 F.2d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding commonality problems with certification), with Jenkins 
v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (insisting that the “threshold” for a 
commonality holding “is not high”). The predominance inquiry remained confused. Payton v. Abbott 
Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D. Mass. 1979). Whether “across-the-board” classes could be certified in 
employment discrimination cases remained an open question until the Supreme Court decided the 
issue in 1982. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
 329. See, e.g., Greenhaw v. Lubbock Cnty. Beverage Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(“We acknowledge that Rule 23 may galvanize claims that would never have been made and thus 
foster a litigious attitude that needs no fuel. On the other hand, the class device is an enforcing 
mechanism for congressionally sanctioned goals.”). 
 330. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Judicial 
Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. at 106, 117 (1978). 
 331. Id. at 419. 
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1. Measures of Stability 
No good, systematic data regarding Rule 23’s use in the 1970s and into 
the 1980s exist.
332
 What data the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
did collect show significant decreases in filing rates in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, except for securities class actions.
333
 These numbers hardly 
speak for themselves, even if they were robust. They suggest, for example, 
that plaintiffs filed many fewer antitrust class actions. But no statistician 
has attempted to disentangle the effect of changing procedural doctrine 
from substantive developments,
334
 and the data’s poor quality questions 
the wisdom of any such exercise. 
A number of more indirect measures confirm this stabilization in class 
action law and politics by the end of the 1970s. The tepid response the 
Carter Administration bill elicited from all players in the class action game 
is one indicator. Also, none of the major decision-makers with 
responsibility for class action governance felt compelled to do much of 
anything after the decade ended. Between 1980 and 1997, the Supreme 
Court issued only two decisions with lasting importance for class action 
doctrine.
335
 Falcon in 1982 confirmed what several circuits thought 
Rodriguez had already accomplished in 1977.
336
 The 1985 decision in 
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts approved a jurisdictional understanding about 
which, at least in the federal courts, there was “never any question” in the 
 
 
 332. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts kept data on class action filings starting in the 
early 1970s. E.g., 1991 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, 14 CLASS ACTION REP. 284, 285 (1991). 
But these data were so incomplete as to prevent the Federal Judicial Center from completing a planned 
empirical study of Rule 23 in the early 1990s. See MINUTES, MEETING OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL RULES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 5 (1995), in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 195 (1997), available at http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol1.pdf. 
 333. 1991 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, supra note 332, at 285 (1991). 
 334. These would include Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which denied antitrust standing to indirect 
purchasers and thus shrank the pool of prospective class action plaintiffs considerably. 431 U.S. 720 
(1977). See In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, etc., 523 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(commenting on Illinois Brick’s impact on certain types of class actions). They would also include 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which lessened the scrutiny courts 
afford vertical restraints. On changing antitrust doctrine starting in the late 1970s, see generally E. 
Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing 
Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1607 (2004). 
 335. There were other decisions of lesser significance, especially for class action doctrine. E.g., 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 336. E.g., Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir. 1979) (reading Rodriguez as precluding 
across-the-board class actions). 
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1970s.
337
 Congress made a couple of minor adjustments to class action 
practice in a couple of substantive areas during the 1980s.
338
 It did not 
consider a bill as thoroughgoing as the Carter Administration’s, and after 
that effort fifteen years would pass before Congress approved significant 
class action reform.
339
 The Advisory Committee in 1982 voted “to do 
nothing” with respect to Rule 23, “but let the matter simmer . . . .”340 In 
1985, the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association sent a set of 
recommendations for wholesale class action reform, which the group had 
labored over for years, to the committee. They languished unstudied until 
1990.
341
 Even minor suggestions found no audience. When Judge 
Weinstein proposed a tweak to Rule 23 in 1985,
342
 the committee did not 
discuss it until 1989.
343
 
The temperature of judicial rhetoric also cooled in the 1980s. The 
1970s were a time of crisis, if the tone of decision-after-decision is any 
indicator. Judges worried that Rule 23 threatened “a wholesome degree of 
difference between the judicial and administrative functions.”344 They 
regretted how “[c]lass actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves 
of the green bay tree,”345 and one speculated whether “the Rule 23(b)(3) 
 
 
 337. Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 413 F. Supp. 88, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Shutts v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1977) (describing the federal courts as “relatively 
untroubled” about the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident class members). 
 338. Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group 
Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52 (1984) (describing legislation limiting Legal Service 
Corporation lawyers’ abilities to bring class actions). 
 339. A search of the “congressional publications” database within Lexis Congressional Universe 
for the time period of Jan. 1, 1981, through Jan. 1, 1990, yielded 26 documents. (1980 was excluded 
because a number of documents about the Carter Administration’s bill, proposed in 1978, were 
released that year.) In comparison, a search for Jan. 1, 1971, through Jan 1, 1980, resulted in 82 hits. 
 340. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, SUMMARY OF MEETING 10 (May 27–28, 1982), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-1982-min.pdf. 
According to Paul Carrington, the committee’s reporter for part of the 1980s, it did so because “it was 
then believed . . . that Rule 23 was politically too sensitive to permit further consideration . . . .” Letter 
from Paul D. Carrington to Standing Committee on Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States (May 21, 1996), in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 29, 31, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol2.pdf. 
 341. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON CLASS ACTION IMPROVEMENTS, 110 F.R.D. 195, 196 (1986); see also REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (Mar. 12, 1991), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscou
rts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1991-03.pdf. 
 342. NEW PROPOSALS FOR JUNE 1985 MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE 6 (1989), in RECORDS 
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-8521-74 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 343. MINUTES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES6 (1989), available at http://www.us 
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-1989-min.pdf. 
 344. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 345. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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class action is always unethical and improperly coercive.”346 To Tenth 
Circuit judges in 1973, Rule 23 was at a “crossroads,” with: 
many knowledgeable lawyers and some judges maintaining that it 
should be scrapped; others that it should be substantially revised or 
reformed; and still others that it should be even more liberally 
administered to effectuate or promote societal objectives bearing 
little relationship to economics or practicality.
347
 
These sorts of existential musings or angst from federal judges are harder 
to find in 1980s-era opinions. The Second Circuit’s changing levels of 
Rule 23 anxiety are a good example. It inveighed repeatedly against 
perceived excesses in the class action experiment in the 1970s.
348
 By the 
mid-1980s, the court blessed perhaps the greatest Rule 23 adventure of all 
time, at least up to that point, when it affirmed Judge Weinstein’s handling 
of the Agent Orange litigation.
349
 
A final indicator is particularly revealing. Defense interests began to 
accept the federal class action by the end of the 1970s. It is hard to 
imagine the U.S. Chamber of Commerce praising the “painstakingly 
developed” Rule 23, as its spokesperson did in 1978,350 if the device 
threatened its constituents with economic doom. Testifying about antitrust 
legislation in 1979, a company’s general counsel admitted that “[c]lass 
actions in today’s world are a necessary way to administer justice.”351 
Defense lawyers grew comfortable enough with the federal class action by 
the mid-1980s that they, not plaintiffs’ lawyers, pushed for Rule 23’s 
innovative use in mass tort litigation.
352
 
 
 
 346. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238–39 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., 
concurring); cf. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 559 F.2d 209, 221 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting) (complaining about the “decidedly hostile” “vibrations” other judges on the Third Circuit 
had been sending about the class action), aff’d, 437 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 347. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474 F.2d 336, 349 (10th Cir. 1973); see also 
Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fay, J., concurring) (“Class actions 
are unique creatures with enormous potential for good and evil.”). 
 348. Herbst v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Franklin Nat. 
Bank Sec. Litig., 574 F.2d 662, 673 (2d Cir. 1978); Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1019. 
 349. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 350. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Judicial 
Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 438 (1978). 
 351. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979 S. 1468: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 42 (1979) 
(statement of Thomas R. Long, General Counsel, Westvaco Corp.). 
 352. E.g., Andrew Blum, It’s Best to Hang Together; Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Sing Praises of Class 
Actions, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 11, 1989, at 1, 54 (reporting that “defense attorneys are turning to [the] 
view” that “it is often better to handle a class or consolidated case than to spend years litigating 
individually”). 
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The Advisory Committee’s reporter would be as well-positioned as 
anyone to take the country’s procedural temperature. In 1988, he told the 
New York Times that “‘class actions had their day in the sun and kind of 
petered out.’”353 For at least one area, the reporter got it right. To the 
extent that the imperfect data reflects reality, the Title VII class action all 
but disappeared during the 1980s.
354
 As an observation about the federal 
class action more generally, however, the reporter may have mistaken 
calm waters for a dry seabed. As the amounts of money changing hands in 
settlements suggest, class action litigation continued to hum along just fine 
over the decade’s course.355 
2. Explaining Class Action Stability 
Some of the likely reasons for why Rule 23 law and politics stabilized 
by 1979 had more to do with a confluence of historical forces than steps 
taken to manage the dilemma of class action governance. Given the 
legislative landscape after 1980, neither conception of Rule 23 was likely 
to gain the upper hand in Congress. The prospect that legislation would 
expand the federal class action dimmed as the public interest movement 
waned and corporate political influence waxed.
356
 At the same time, the 
continued dominance in the House of Representatives of the Democratic 
Party, increasingly supported by plaintiffs’ lawyers, made a wholesale 
 
 
 353. Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988, at 
B7. 
 354. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019–20 (1991). The Donohue and Siegelman study 
drew on the Administrative Office data and must be read with their limitations in mind. 
 355. The record settlement for a securities class action increased from $205 million in 1985 to 
$440 million in 1987 to $700 million in 1988. Settlement Cleared in Case Involving Baldwin-United, 
WALL ST. J., May 2, 1985, at 1; Robert J. Cole, B.P. in $7.82 Billion Deal for Standard, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 1987, at D1; Last Defendant Settles in Bond Default Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1988, at D6. 
From 1983–1986, plaintiffs settled antitrust class actions for over $150 million in coupons alone. See 
Fred Gramlich, Scrip Damages in Antitrust Cases, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 261, 262 (1986). 
 356. See generally VOGEL, supra note 104, at 148–239. On corporate success with public opinion 
in the late 1970s, see SMITH, supra note 105, at 101. On the rise of the business lobby and think tanks 
favorable to businesses in the 1970s, see DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS: THE NEW WASHINGTON AND THE RISE OF THINK TANKS 156, 160–61 (1993); see also 
Patrick J. Akard, Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of U.S. Economic 
Policy in the 1970s, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 597, 601 (1992); Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, 
Retrenchment . . . and Resurgence? Mapping the Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the 
United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 37 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold 
eds., 2006). 
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legislative gutting of Rule 23 unlikely.
357
 The mere fact that an era of 
divided government commenced in 1981 made retrenchment in private 
regulatory litigation unlikely. In such times, Congress, concerned about 
executive branch indifference or hostility, often opts for private litigation 
to implement regulatory objectives.
358
 Strong headwinds probably would 
have greeted a proposal to restrict the class action, in light of its 
importance to the regulatory efficacy of private litigation.
359
 At the same 
time, class action expansionism had no place on the Reagan 
Administration’s deregulatory agenda. 
Likewise, the Advisory Committee’s inattention to Rule 23 during the 
1980s could well have resulted from exhaustion and other contingencies as 
much as satisfaction with a stable body of doctrine. It had pursued class 
action reform with futility for much of the 1970s, so time away from Rule 
23 probably appealed to committee members.
360
 Moreover, the rulemaking 
process attracted significant public criticism, starting in the mid-1970s and 
continuing throughout the 1980s.
361
 In this environment, if committee 
members had any appetite for something as politically-charged as class 
action reform, controversial changes to the sanctions and discovery rules 
probably satisfied it. 
Still, various choices deserve credit for decision-makers’ successful 
creation of class action stability by decades’ end. They have to do with 
how decision-makers managed the regulatory/adjectival divide. Zahn and 
Snyder may have dashed many of the hopes consumer protection 
advocates vested in Rule 23, but they helped to entrench the device. The 
 
 
 357. On the beginnings of trial lawyer political power in the 1970s, see THOMAS F. BURKE, 
LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 47 
(2002). 
 358. FARHANG, supra note 26, at 16, 76–78. 
 359. Ronald Reagan, for example, wanted effectively to prohibit Legal Services Corporation 
lawyers from filing class actions, but Congress would not go along with his proposed restrictions. 
ACLU Blasts Class Action Regulations Proposed by Legal Services Appointee, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 
22, 1982, at 3 (describing proposed regulations that would have required LSC lawyers to get 
affirmative consent from each class member before they could bring class actions); Legal Services 
Reauthorization Act of 1992: Hearing of the Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 102d Cong. 44–45 
(1992) (describing milder restrictions ultimately adopted in 1983 legislation). 
 360. E.g., Peter Gruenberger, Plans for Class-Action Reform, NAT’L L.J., July 8, 1985, at 32 
(reporting that groups, including the Advisory Committee, that have tried for class action reform 
“simply gave up the effort in frustration”). 
 361. Paul Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 161 (1991) 
(wondering if the Advisory Committee will suffer the same fate as the “‘French aristocracy’”); 
Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 
579–80 (1975); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary 
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677 (1975); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking 
Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 936 (1976); id. at 938–39. 
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pair effectively created near-exclusive Congressional control over the 
substantive law litigated in federal class actions. Had the Supreme Court 
extended diversity jurisdiction and opened federal courthouses to state law 
claims regardless of amount, plaintiffs’ lawyers could have shopped for a 
favorable choice-of-law regime and sought the application of a single 
state’s uniquely plaintiff-friendly law on behalf of a nation of class 
members. National regulatory policy would have resulted not from 
deliberate legislative choice but from clever lawyering.
362
 Also, by 
limiting the federal class action to federal substantive law, Snyder and 
Zahn gave Congress a number of different tools it could use to tinker with 
Rule 23’s regulatory consequences. It could adjust class action procedure 
for particular substantive claims, as it considered doing several times,
363
 
but it could also calibrate regulatory consequences by adjusting elements 
of claims or remedial options. Otherwise, Congress would have had to 
preempt state substantive law, a blunter tool less useful for a pragmatic 
balancing strategy. 
A number of choices, some conscious and others not, devolved control 
over the procedure of class action litigation downward and thus enabled 
experimentation over time with Rule 23. Class action reform flummoxed 
the Advisory Committee, and the Supreme Court avoided cases that would 
have required fundamental disquisition on the core requirements for class 
certification. Few significant command-and-control interventions into 
doctrinal development were the consequence. The prospect for 
authoritative guidance on key questions dimmed further in 1978, when the 
Court, following several circuits, rejected interlocutory review of class 
certification decisions.
364
 Left largely to their own devices, the district 
courts could tinker with Rule 23 without committing doctrine to one 
course or another. A pragmatic tinkering strategy is easier to deploy if 
strategists can, in fact, tinker. 
Various decisions affected the characteristics and preferences of 
participants in class action litigation in ways conducive to stability. Eisen 
 
 
 362. State courts in the 1970s and 1980s rarely exercised jurisdiction over a national consumer 
class, unless the case involved a product or service used locally within that state. Kamp, supra note 
230, at 271–72. 
 363. E.g., Handler & Blechman, supra note 299, at 632 (describing legislative history of Hart-
Scott-Rodino antitrust legislation); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972—Conference Report 
(Mar. 6, 1972), in Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 
1843, 1847 (1972) (noting that the House version of the Title VII amendments contained a provision 
prohibiting class actions, that the Senate version did not, and that the Conference Committee went with 
the Senate version). 
 364. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476–77 (1978). 
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and Snyder raised the costs of litigation and narrowed the substantive areas 
implicated by Rule 23. These effects probably helped to shape the 
plaintiffs’ side of the class action bar, which by the end of the decade had 
become the exclusive province of a small number of sophisticated repeat 
players.
365
 Their ongoing engagements with the defense bar created an 
incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to cooperate and keep advocacy within 
limits. This evolution also limited the overall capacity of the plaintiffs’ bar 
for class action litigation. Simply put, defense interests could live with 
class action litigation. By 1980, only a zealot for the adjectival conception 
could look at amounts exchanged in class action settlements and continue 
to assert that the class action posed an existential threat to American 
business.
366
 
Finally, situations in which participants and their preferences are 
irreconcilably split can nonetheless be managed to create stability if 
positions are clear and consequences of decisions easily discernible. A 
dilemma is easier to handle if well-understood. As before, one risks 
overstating the significance of Rule 23 with comparisons to world 
historical events like Nixon’s reversal of fortune. But an analogy 
illustrates. The bipolar Cold War world, however rift by ideological 
conflict, remained stable for nearly fifty years. To some political scientists, 
this equilibrium resulted in part because the easily-understood division 
between two roughly equal spheres of influence facilitated understandings 
of what would happen were politics to evolve in one direction or 
another.
367
 
 
 
 365. The plaintiffs’ side antitrust bar is illustrative. See James B. Stewart, Jr., The $300-Million 
Paper Case, AM. LAW., July 1979, at 20, 21 (describing the small size of the bar); Tamar Lewin, 
Class-Action Fees Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1982, at D1; In Camera, 7 CLASS ACTION REP. 
253, 253 (1982); cf. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 71 (2000). 
 366. One study estimated that plaintiffs had recovered a total of $2.5 billion in securities and 
antitrust litigation, the two most lucrative class action fields, from 1966 to 1979. Developments: 
Attorney Fee Awards in Securities Class Actions, 5 CLASS ACTION REP. 470, 520 (1978). According to 
another study of securities litigation, the forty largest companies studied faced a class action or 
derivative suit once every 2.5 years from 1971–1978, a figure that includes duplicative litigation over 
the same issue. Two-thirds of the 190 companies in the sample never had to defend any suits during 
this time period. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder 
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971–1978, 60 B.U. L. REV. 306, 323 (1980). 
 367. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, 18 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 615, 622 
(1988) (“In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other. . . . In a 
multipolar world, dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily 
obscured.”); see also Kenneth N. Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World, 93 DAEDALUS 881 (1964); 
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System, 10 
INT’L SEC. 99, 105–10 (1986). 
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Given that most claims litigated in class actions by 1979 were 
negative-value, defense interests had no incentive to argue for applications 
of Rule 23 inconsistent with the adjectival conception of Rule 23. The 
more modest its use, the less overall litigation they would face.
368
 In none 
of Rule 23’s substantive areas, at least circa 1980, did class counsel 
displace plaintiffs’ lawyers who were already litigating claims 
individually.
369
 The lawyers on the plaintiffs’ side thus had every incentive 
to urge courts to expand Rule 23’s use, consistent with a regulatory 
conception of the device. The clarity of the conflict between the 
irreducibly inconsistent preferences participants held contributed to the 
stability of class action doctrine. Excess enthusiasm for regulatory 
efficacy, like that manifested by the Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez, necessarily 
came at the expense of judicial institutional integrity. Likewise, Judge 
Sneed’s insistence that class litigation respect the “essential” aspects of the 
“judicial process” implied limits on Rule 23’s regulatory potential. 
CONCLUSION: THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE 
A normative assessment of the Goldilocks strategy decision-makers 
used to create class action stability by the end of Rule 23’s first period 
requires a yardstick whose provision lies beyond this Article’s scope. 
Nineteen eighty is a logical cutoff, but arbitrary nonetheless, and a 
rigorous evaluation of the preference for pragmatic balancing in the 1970s 
would benefit from the next thirty years of class action history. Although I 
am reluctant to commit to a particular measure, the pragmatist in me finds 
the idea of “optimizing,” or a preference for “action that is best relative to 
constraints,” appealing.370 Advocates on both sides of the divide in the late 
1970s continued to grumble about the not-too-hot, not-too-cold 
 
 
 368. In the notorious Fine Paper litigation, fifteen corporate class members, including Exxon, 
IBM, and Xerox, intervened to object to the fee request and paid a lot of money to have a law firm 
compile an audit. They did not stand to profit from the action in the form of increased settlement 
proceeds, and likely undertook the exercise to try to obtain a sweeping opinion that could damage the 
class action going forward. For the history of the dispute, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private 
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 
215, 252–61 (1983). 
 369. I am unaware of any friction in the 1970s of the sort that would emerge between class 
counsel and personal injury lawyers in the 1980s over mass torts. For an example of this friction, see 
James B. Stewart, Wake of Disaster: Controversy Surrounds Payments to Plaintiffs in Hyatt Regency 
Case—Fighting Among Attorneys Worked Against Victims of Collapsed Skywalks—The Failure of a 
Class Action, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1984, at 2. 
 370. Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607, 607 (2005). 
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approach.
371
 But a commitment to one side of the divide or the other may 
well have provoked a backlash. Although the ground had shifted 
considerably by then, the federal class action’s experience in the 1990s 
suggests what can happen if Rule 23’s deployment distends institutional 
roles. Olympian attempts to use class certification as a cure-all for the 
country’s mass tort woes sparked a counter reformation and significant 
class action retrenchment.
372
 At the same time, one readily imagines that 
the Congress, responsible for so much public interest legislation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, would have reacted unfavorably had courts entirely 
kneecapped Rule 23 in the name of institutional integrity. 
Another first pass at evaluation using an optimizing metric considers 
the class action as part of the federal regulatory apparatus. At an abstract 
level, the governance dilemma for public administration more generally is 
not different from what the federal class action creates. Courts reviewing 
agency actions constantly have to balance regulatory efficacy against 
democratic legitimacy, while scrutinizing their own institutional 
limitations in the process. In context-after-context, they have opted for a 
variant of the pragmatic balancing strategy. This broader administrative 
experience suggests what is possible when decision-makers have to 
reconcile a round institutional peg with a square regulatory hole. If private 
litigation has a legitimate regulatory role to play, and if institutional 
integrity is a valid concern, then a balance between the two, however 
unprincipled, may be the best one can expect. 
The calm seas of the early 1980s did not last long. Within ten years, the 
class action would become a sizeable headache for Congress and 
rulemakers. Since then, its governance has remained a problem to be 
solved, not a balance to be struck. These are stories for the next chapters of 
Rule 23’s history. 
 
 
 371. Compare Citizens’ Access to the Courts Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 14 (1978) 
(statement of Andrew Feinstein, Public Citizen Congress Watch) (“From the point of view of 
consumers, [R]ule 23 has been a failure.”), with Hearings, supra note 330, at 247 (statement of 
William Simon) (suggesting that the class action has led to the “degradation of the legal profession”). 
 372. The Advisory Committee began work on amendments to Rule 23 in the early 1990s 
expressly in response to the mass tort problem. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (Mar. 12, 1991), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judcon
f/proceedings/1991-03.pdf. I will address this history in a subsequent article. A rough draft telling the 
story is available. 
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